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PRISONERS WITH AIDS: CONSTITUTIONAL
AND STATUTORY RIGHTS IMPLICATED IN
FAMILY VISITATION PROGRAMS
Since the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) reported the first
cases of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)' in 1981, 2
the disease has evolved into a full-scale epidemic.' AIDS has had a
pervasive and profound impact on various segments of United
States society, 4 including employment, 5 health care," education,' and
housing. 8 At the same time, a wave of AIDS-related litigation has
' AIDS is a disease caused by the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) that can destroy
the body's ability to fight infections. The virus allows other infections to invade the body. T.
HAMMETT, Essential Medical Information, in AIDS IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES: ISSUES AND
OP-riorts 1, 3 (1988),
2 U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON ACQUIRED
IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 5 (1986) !hereinafter SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT].
3 As of February 28, 1990, there had been 124,984 cases of AIDS reported to the Centers
for Disease Control (CDC). U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., H1V/AIDS SURVEIL-
LANCE 5 (March, 1990) [hereinafter H HS, 1-11V/AIDS SURVEILLANCE]. The number of cases
of AIDS reported to the CDC is thought to capture about 90% of the actual cases meeting
the CDC's surveillance definition. T. HAtimurr, Epidemiology of HIV Infection and AIDS in
Correctional Facilities and the Population at Large, in 1988 UPDATE: AIDS IN CORRECTIONAL.
FACILITIES I, 7 (1989). 13y February 28, 1990, 76,030 persons had died of AIDS in the United
States. H HS, HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE, supra, at 13. The Public Health Service estimates
that, by the end of 1992, there will have been 365,000 AIDS cases diagnosed and 263,000
cumulative deaths. T. HAmmErr, Epidemiology of HIV Infection and AIDS, supra, at 7. Moreover,
the Public Health Service estimates that a range of 1 to 1.5 million Americans were asymp-
tomatically infected in 1988. Id. The racial and ethnic breakdown of AIDS cases in the United
States represents an increasing overrepresentation of blacks and Hispanics. 'This
reflects a shift in the AIDS epidemic from gay white males to black and Hispanic intravenous
drug users, their sexual partners, and children. Id.
4 See generally M. GUNDERSON, D. MAYO & F. RHAME, AIDS: TESTING AND PRIVACY 1
(1989) (examines role of HIV testing and its constitutional implications),
5 See, e.g., Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701, 712 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding
that teacher with AIDS was entitled to preliminary injunction allowing him to continue to
teach).
See SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 2, at 6. According to former Surgeon
General C. Everett Koop, M.D., "in the year 1991, an estimated 145,000 patients with AIDS
will need health and supportive services at a total cost of between $8 and $16 billion." See
also M. GUNDERSON, 1). MAYO & F. RHAME, Apra note 4, at 147-63 for a general discussion
of AIDS testing and health care delivery.
7
 Parents have filed an increasing number of claims seeking to enjoin school districts
from preventing children with AIDS or human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) from attend-
ing school. See, e.g., Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School Dist., 662 F. Stipp. 376, 376 (C.D.
Cal. 1987).
See Graham, AIDS Lives Here, Boston Phoenix, Oct. 6, 1989, at 6, col. 4.
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arisen from the alleged infringement of both constitutional and
statutory rights of the increasing numbers of individuals with
A IDS. 9
Prisons in the United States have not been immune from the
growing incidence of AIDS. 1 ° Because of the increasing number of
inmates infected with AIDS, prisons have promulgated new policies
and regulations to address the special needs and demands of a
terminally ill population." The presence or absence of AIDS-related
policies and regulations has triggered lawsuits against the prisons
by inmates with AIDS alleging violations of their constitutional
rights. 12
 Prison regulations purportedly directed toward penological
goals of order, security and deterrence have challenged and, some-
times, further restricted the already limited constitutional and sta-
tutory rights of inmates.' 5
See, e.g., Thomas, 662 F. Supp. at 382; see also THE NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT: 1988
AIDS IN PRISON BIBLIOGRAPHY 23-27 (1988) [hereinafter NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT BIBLI-
OGRAPHY].
" See T. HAMMETT, supra note 3, at 9. As of October I, 1988, a cumulative total of 3136
confirmed cases of AIDS among inmates in 70 responding federal, state, and local correc-
tional systems in the United States had been reported. Id. A total of 2047 cases of AIDS were
reported in 44 state and federal correctional systems. Id. In 1988, the overall incidence of
AIDS for state and federal correctional facilities ranged from 0 to 536 per 100,000 prison
population, compared with 13.3 cases per 100,000 total United States population. Id. at 11.
The higher rate of incidence in correctional facilities appears to arise' from the higher
percentage of high-risk groups in the prison population. Prisoners are placed at high risk
for contracting the AIDS virus through past or present intravenous drug use and through
homosexual activity. Id. A cumulative total of 1088 inmates (1051 males and 37 females) had
died of AIDS while in custody in state and federal prison systems. Id. at 9. According to
Hammett, "Nit some correctional systems, AIDS has come to account for a significant
proportion of all mortalities. In New York, almost 60% of deaths among correctional inmates
in 1987 and 1988 were the result of AIDS." Id. Many more prisoners are HIV-positive. Id.
at 14-15. Seroprevalence (HIV-positive) rates among prisoners are estimated to be much
higher than in the general population, attributable to the high percentage of intravenous
drug use in the prison population. Id. at 11. The seroprevalence rates appear to vary
significantly from as low as 0% to as high as 17%. Id. at 15.
1 I See T. I-IAMMErr, supra note 3, at 23.
' 2 See, e.g., Doe v. Coughlin, 697 F. Supp. 1234, 1235 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (involuntary
transfer of HIV-positive inmates to special dormitory); Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874,
874-75 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (non-consensual disclosure of HIV status of inmates to non-medical
staff and other inmates); see also NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 9, at
14-23. Prisoners have filed suits alleging constitutional infringements based on violation of
confidentiality, mandatory segregation, conditions of confinement, medical care, mandatory
testing, criminal assault, and deprivation of programs. Id.
13 See, e.g., Procunier v, Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412 (1974). The Supreme Court delin-
eated the following penological objectives: preservation of internal order and discipline,
maintenance of institutional security against escape or unauthorized entry, and rehabilitation
of prisoners. Id.
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Although courts traditionally have granted prison officials great
deference, they have responded unevenly to AIDS-related prison
regulations." Moreover, courts have subjected such regulations to
very limited review.' 5 At times, prisons have adopted policies that
ostensibly arise from legitimate penological goals but, in reality, may
stem from prejudicial reactions to AIDS.' 6 One such policy is the
ineligibility of prisoners with AIDS to participate in family visitation
programs.' 7
In Doe v. Coughlin, the one case to address conjugal visits for
prisoners with AIDS, the New York Court of Appeals in 1987
upheld state prison regulations denying such visits.'s The Doe court
held that the denial of a prisoner's participation in a family visitation
program neither infringed upon the prisoner's constitutional rights
nor violated section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the
Rehabilitation Act), 19 which prohibits discrimination on the basis of
handicap in federally funded programs:2° The court reasoned that
the state did not infringe upon the prisoner's constitutional rights
because there is no constitutional right to conjugal visits. 2 ' In ad-
dition, according to the Doe court, prison officials had a rational
basis for prohibiting a prisoner with AIDS from participating in
conjugal visits. 22 The court also held that the state's denial did not
violate the Rehabilitation Act because a prisoner with AIDS was not
eligible to participate in conjugal visits."
14 See infra notes 35-57 and accompanying text for a more complete discussion of judicial
deference to prison administrators. See also Comment, AIDS Behind Bars; Prison Responses and
Judicial Deference, 62 TEMP. L. Rev. 327, 334-38 (1989) [hereinafter Comment, AIDS Behind
Bars].
15 See Cordero v. Coughlin, 607 F. Supp. 9, 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Doe v. Coughlin, 71
N.Y.2d 48, 56, 518 N.E.2d 536, 542, 523 N.Y.S.2d 782, 788 (1987), cell. denied, 109 S. Ct.
196 (1988).
id See generally Comment, AIDS Behind Bars, supra note 14, at 328, 352 (advocates that
prison responses to AIDS may be pretext for discrimination).
17 To date, only 10 states allow conjugal visits in their state prisons. Such visits provide
overnight visitation between prisoners and family members, typically spouses and children.
These 10 states include California, Connecticut, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Mexico, New
York, South Carolina, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. Telephone conversation with Theo-
dore Hammett, Cambridge, Massachusetts, October 10, 1989. See infra notes 240-242 and
accompanying text for a more complete description of family visitation programs.
15 Doe, 71 N.Y.2d at 60, 518 N.E.2d at 544, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
19 Section 504 is codified at 29 U.S.C. §1 706(8)(C), 794 (1988).
20 Doe, 71 N.Y.2d at 60, 518 N.E.2d at 544, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
21 Id. at 54, 518 N.E.2d at 540, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 786.
22 Id.
25 Id. at 61, 518 N.E.2d at 544, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 790,
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This note examines the constitutional and statutory issues
raised by differing treatments accorded inmates with AIDS and
their families in the context of family visitation programs. Section
I provides an overview of both the traditional judicial deference to
prison officials and the constitutional rights of prisoners, including
marital privacy. 24
 This section also addresses the standards of judi-
cial review that courts have applied to substantive due process and
equal protection claims of prisoners under the fourteenth amend-
ment.23
 Section II provides an overview of the impact of AIDS on
the constitutional and statutory rights of prisoners. 26 The section
addresses the impact of AIDS on the judicial treatment of the
constitutional claims of AIDS-infected prisoners. 27 Section II then
discusses the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and reviews its application
to prisoners with AIDS. 28
 Section III provides an overview of family
visitation programs in prisons. 29 Section III also presents the New
York Court of Appeals' majority and dissenting opinions in Doe v.
Coughlin, the case denying AIDS-infected prisoners the right to
participate in family visitation programs." Section 1V analyzes the
Doe court's minimum scrutiny analysis and its refusal to find an
infringement of constitutional rights of AIDS-infected inmates or
their families. 3 ' Section IV advocates a strict scrutiny standard for
courts in reviewing regulations that implicate the fundamental right
to marital privacy and equal protection under the law. 32 Further,
this section analyzes the Doe court's failure to apply the Rehabilita-
tion Act to the AIDS-infected prisoner's claim of discrimination."
Finally, Section IV discusses the need for judicial intervention, not
deference, in the face of prison regulations infringing upon consti-
tutional and statutory rights of prisoners." This note concludes that
the state's denial of an AIDS-infected prisoner's participation in
conjugal visits solely because of AIDS is an impermissible infringe-
ment upon that individual's constitutional and statutory rights.
" See infra notes 35-100 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 101-38 and accompanying text.
'° See infra notes 139-234 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 140-176 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 177-234 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 235-259 and accompanying text.
s° See infra notes 260-337 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 338-92 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 358-92 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 393-438 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 439-447 and accompanying text.
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I. THE ROLE OF COURTS IN THE PRISON CONTEXT
A. The Balancing of Penological Interests and Prisoners' Rights
Traditionally, courts have sought to strike a balance between
deference to legitimate penological objectives and the protection of
prisoners' constitutional and statutory rights." Prison officials have
strong penological interests in the establishment of order, discipline,
and security." Prison officials design regulations to ensure the ful-
fillment of these interests in the day-to-day administration of the
prisons." Prison regulations may limit the rights of prisoners in
order to ensure the general security and welfare of the entire prison
population, including the correctional staff." Because of the special
nature of prisons, prison officials may restrict or deny rights to
inmates that free citizens take for granted."
Historically, courts have taken a broad, hands-off approach to
prison administration." In part, judicial deference results from the
courts' perception of the appropriate separation of powers, in which
prison administration is considered to be within the purview of the
legislative and executive, and not the judicial, branches of govern-
ment.'" Consequently, courts have adopted a policy of judicial re-
straint, particularly where the operation of state prisons implicates
federalism concerns. 42
 Moreover, courts have stated that they lack
the special expertise and knowledge of prison administrators in
penal operations. 43
 Courts are reluctant, if not unwilling, to substi-
tute their judgment for that of prison administrators. 44
More recently, however, courts have rejected complete defer-
ence to prison administrators and have been more wary of indis-
" See Turner v. Salley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987); see also Comment, AIDS Behind Bars,
supra note 14, at 334-38 for a description of judicial deference to prison administrators.
" See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 11.8 (1984); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
547 (1979).
" See Bell, 441 U.S. at 547.
3" See id. at 546.
3H See id.
" See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404 (1974); see also S. Kita•rz, THE Law
Or CORREGTIONs AND PRISONERS' RIGHTS 242 (1981) (quoting Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62
Va. (21 Omit.) 790, 796 (1871)); R. SINGER & W. STATSKY, RIGHTS or THE IMPRISONED 581
(1974).
4 ' See Turner v. Salley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1987); Bell, 441 U.S. at 548; Procunier, 416
U.S. at. 405.
42 See Turner, 482 U.S. at 85.
43
 See, e.g., Bell, 441 U.S. at 548.
" See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353 (1987); Block v. Rutherford, 468
U.S. 576, 588 (1984).
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criminate deference to prison officials, particularly where prison
regulations have implicated the constitutional rights of prisoners."
Yet, prisoners do not enjoy the same rights and privileges of free
citizens.'" The exigencies of the penal system may justify the restric-
tion of many of the rights and privileges enjoyed by the ordinary
citizen. 47
 Courts have recognized, however, that they can draw no
"iron curtain" between the Constitution and the prison." Prisoners
do retain certain constitutional rights, including substantial religious
freedom," protection from invidious racial discrimination, 50 access
to courts,5 ' protection from cruel and unusual punishment, 52 lim-
ited freedom of speech," and the right to marry. 54
 When a prison
regulation infringes upon any of these constitutional rights, courts
weigh such rights against the penological objectives put forth to
justify such infringement in order to determine whether the actions
of prison officials are justified. 55
Thus, although courts have upheld many constitutional rights
of prisoners, these rights are subject to restrictions imposed by the
exigencies of the penal system." Courts seek to balance their policy
of judicial restraint against the need to protect prisoners' rights. 57
The balancing of these competing interests involves a weighing of
the nature of the prisoners' rights against the legitimacy of the
purported penological objectives put forth to justify restrictions of
those rights.
' 5 See, e.g., Block, 468 U.S. at 593-94 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
" 6 See Bell, 441 U.S. at 546.
" See id.
" See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974). The Court stated in Wolff:
"[Though his rights may be diminished by the needs and exigencies of the institutional
environment, a prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is
imprisoned for crime. There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the
prisons of this country." Id.
" 9 See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (prisoners' complaint alleging denial of
free exercise of religion stated valid claim under the first amendment).
"See Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 333 (1968) (segregation of races in prison violated
equal protection clause of fourteenth amendment).
51 See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969) (prisoners have right of access to courts
to present their complaints).
" See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (prisoners have right to medical care as
part of prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment).
" See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974) ("A prisoner retains those first amend-
ment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate
penological objectives of the corrections system").
54 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-96 (1987).
" See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974).
" See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974).
57 See Turner, 482 U.S. at 85.
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B. Constitutional Rights of Prisoners
In considering the constitutionality of prison regulations, courts
have had to determine what constitutional rights of free citizens are
preserved in the prison setting. The United States Supreme Court
has firmly established the fundamental right of privacy as a liberty
interest for all free citizens. 58 Any right to privacy for prisoners,
however, initially might appear to be contradictory to incarcera-
tion. 59 At the very least, courts have held that the legitimate pen-
ological concerns of institutional security and order necessitate re-
strictions on prisoners' privacy. 80 Courts have imposed such
restrictions, for example, in search and seizure actions, 8 ' and in
receipt of subscription publications. 62 In these instances, the Su-
preme Court has reasoned that prisons are public institutions, not
private places, and that prisoners, therefore, must be subject to the
necessary constraints of those institutions.°
Nonetheless, courts generally recognize some privacy rights for
prisoners, including the right to marry. 64 The Supreme Court has
described the decision to marry as one of the personal decisions
protected by the right of privacy. 65 In the 1965 case of Griswold v.
" See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 115, 152-53 (1973) (abortion); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (contra-
ception).
"See R. SINGER & W. STATSKY, supra note 40, at 564.
" See Comment, AIDS Behind Bars, supra note 14, at 336-37.
" See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984) ("(S]ociety is not prepared to recognize
as legitimate any subjective expectation of privacy that a prisoner might have in his prison
cell and that, accordingly, the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches
does not apply within the confines of the prison cell").
62 See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. 1874, 1882 (1989) (Federal Bureau of Prisons
had right to exclude incoming publications that "although not necessarily 'likely' to lead to
violence, are determined by the warden to create an intolerable risk of disorder under the .
conditions of a particular prison at a particular time").
" See Note, Conjugal Visitation Rights and the Appropriate Standard of Judicial Review for
Prison Regulations, 73 MICH, L. REV. 398, 403 (1974) thereinafter Note, Conjugal Visitation
Rights].
64 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,
384 (1978)); see also Salisbury v. List, 501 F. Supp. 105, 110 (D. Nev. 1980) (applying strict
scrutiny in holding that Nevada Department of Prisons could not prohibit women from
marrying inmates in the absence of a compelling state interest). But see Butler v. Wilson, 415
U.S. 953, 953 (1974), aff 'g Johnson v. Rockefeller, 365 F. Supp. 377, 381-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
The Supreme Court's decision in Butler can be distinguished from Turner. In Butler, the
prisoners were sentenced to life imprisonment, and the district court considered the denial
of the right to marry to be part of the punishment for the crime because the governmental
interest in punishing the crime was sufficiently important to justify the deprivation of the
right to marry. Johnson, 365 F. Supp. at 381-82 (Lasker, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
95 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978).
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Connecticut, the United States Supreme Court held that a Connect-
icut birth control law forbidding a married couple's use of contra-
ceptives violated the marital privacy right protected by the Consti-
tution.66 The Court further expanded the fundamental right of
privacy in marriage to embrace intimate decision-making of the
married couple as part of this right. 67
Some lower courts have held that prisoners do not waive their
right to marital privacy. 68 For example, in the 1980 case of Salisbury
v. List, the United States District Court for the District of Nevada
struck down an inmate marriage procedure because it interfered
with the prisoner's constitutional right to marry. 69 In Salisbury, the
Nevada Department of Prisons enforced a marriage procedure that
prohibited inmates from marrying in the absence of any strong
compelling reason. 7° The state promulgated such a procedure to
maintain order, discipline, and proper custody of the inmates. 7 '
Although the court acknowledged that a state may deny inmates
from marrying for compelling reasons, the court held that no such
compelling reasons existed in this case. 72 The Salisbury court held
that a prisoner's right to marry is part of the fundamental right of
privacy under the fourteenth amendment." The court concluded
that a prisoner's right to marry must be upheld in the absence of
any compelling state interests, and, therefore, it struck down the
inmate marriage procedure as unconstitutional. 74
In contrast, other courts have limited the prisoners' right of
marital privacy. 75 In the 1974 case of Lyons v. Gilligan, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio held that the
prisoners' constitutional right of privacy does not extend to sexual
intimacy between prisoners and their wives during visits. 76 The Lyons
66 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
67 Id.
" See, e.g., Salisbury, 501 F. Supp. at 109. See also infra notes 155-173 and accompanying
text for a discussion of cases in which courts upheld the privacy rights of AIDS-infected
prisoners.
69 501 F. Supp. at 110.
79 Id. at 106. The procedure specifically stated that the Director of the Nevada Depart-
ment of Prisons "may permit an inmate to marry when legal and institutional requirements
have been met and it appears that the union will be constructive in effect on both parties."
Id.
7I Id.
" Id. at 107.
" Id, at 109.
74 Id. at 110.
"See, e.g., Lyons v. Gilligan, 383 F. Supp. 198, 200 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
" Id.
July 1990]	 PRISONERS WITH AIDS 	 975
court noted that the state does not have an affirmative duty to
create special places in prisons for the private conduct of marital
relations."
Despite the penal system's power to impose substantial restric-
tions on prisoners' right to marry, the United States Supreme Court
has held that, at the very least, prisoners still retain the basic right
to marry." In Turner v. Salley, the Supreme Court in 1987 struck
down a corrections regulation that prohibited inmates from mar-
rying other inmates or civilians unless the superintendent deter-
mined that compelling reasons for the marriage existed." In hold-
ing that the regulation was unconstitutional because it interfered
with the prisoner's constitutional right to marry, the Turner Court
recognized that many of the important attributes of marriage still
exist in prison." By concluding that the decision to marry remains
completely private and that the United States Constitution protects
the marital relationship in the prison context as a liberty interest,
the Court has acknowledged the prisoner's right to privacy in some
of the decision-making surrounding marriage. 8 '
Despite the existence of the right of marital privacy, however,
prison officials at times may still seek to restrict it. 82 In those situa-
tions, courts must balance this fundamental right against the com-
peting interests in penological security and order." Some courts
have upheld prisoners' fundamental right of privacy because these
penological interests did not outweigh this fundamental right. 84
Other courts, however, have held that prisoners' constitutional right
of privacy is sufficiently limited that any infringement of penological
interests in the expression of privacy justifies its restriction." In
effect, courts have reached different results in weighing the fun-
77 Id .
" See Turner v. Salley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-96 (1987).
19 Id. at 87. See infra notes 131-136 for a more complete discussion of Turner.
"Turner, 482 U.S. at 95, 99. The Turner Court noted that these attributes include
emotional support, public commitment, personal dedication, and religious faith. Id. at 95.
81 See id. at 95-96.
81 See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 589 (1984). In dissent, justice Marshall de-
scribed the fundamental right regarding family relationships to be the "freedom to engage
in and prevent the deterioration of [prisoners'] relationships with their families .... Persons'
freedom to enter into, maintain, and cultivate familial relations is entitled to constitutional
protection." Id. at 598-99 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
85 See id. at 589.
" See, e.g., Turner, 482 U.S. at 96. See also infra notes 155-173 for a discussion of cases
in which courts have held that AIDS-infected prisoners' privacy rights outweigh any penol-
ogical interests.
85 See, e.g., Lyons v. Gilligan, 382 F, Supp. 198, 200 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
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damental right of privacy against competing penological interests.
Courts, however, commonly have employed minimum scrutiny,
which merely requires a rational relationship between a regulation
and a legitimate state purpose, as the standard of review in deciding
the prisoner's right to privacy. 86
Just as prison regulations sometimes infringe upon the consti-
tutional rights of prisoners, they also may infringe upon the rights
of spouses and other family members." For example, in the 1974
case of Procunier v. Martinez, the United States Supreme Court
struck down mail censorship regulations in the prisons as a restric-
tion on the first and fourteenth amendment rights of free citizens. 88
In Martinez, prison regulations allowed prison officials to censor
correspondence between inmates of California prisons and both
outsiders and other prison inmates." The Martinez Court applied a
heightened standard of review to the regulations because they im-
plicated the constitutional rights of free citizens, those persons cor-
responding with prisoners. 90 Specifically, the Court held that the
mail regulations must further important or substantial, not merely
legitimate, governmental interests." The Court held the regulations
unconstitutional because they did not meet this higher standard of
review, a standard not applied to the rights of prisoners them-
selves. 92
In the recent 1989 case of Thornburgh v. Abbott, the United
States Supreme Court overturned Martinez in part, holding that
censorship of incoming mail for federal prisoners was justified be-
cause of legitimate institutional security concerns reasonably linked
to incoming mail." Outgoing mail was not at issue because the
penological interests of security and order were relevant only to
incoming mail that might jeopardize the internal prison environ-
ment." The Supreme Court noted that prison walls do not prevent
Be See infra notes 105-105 and accompanying text for a discussion of minimum scrutiny.
87 See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 409 (1974).
69
 Id. at 399.
9a Id. at 413.
91 /41.
" Id. at 415; see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 97 (1987). The Turner Court noted
that a state regulation severely limiting the rights of prisoners to marry also infringed on the
rights of civilians seeking to marry prisoners. Id. at 97. In dicta, the Turner Court noted that
the implication of non-prisoners' rights might warrant the application of the Martinez stan-
dard but did not reach this question because the marriage regulation did not withstand
scrutiny, even under the reasonableness standard. Id.
"Thornburgh v. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. 1874, 1879-81 (1989).
"Id.
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free citizens from exercising their own constitutional rights by seek-
ing contact with those on the inside." In weighing the legitimate
demands of those on the outside against the legitimate need for
order and security on the inside, the Court upheld prison officials'
interests in order and security. 96 Relying on its earlier decisions
involving prison regulations affecting the rights of prisoners and
non-prisoners, the Supreme Court in Abbott broadly stated, in con-
trast to Martinez, that these two groups should not be subject to
separate standards.97
Courts have held that prisoners have constitutionally protected
rights to privacy that include the marital relationship." Courts may
restrict such rights, however, and subject them to a balancing of
competing interests between penological goals and prisoners'
rights." When prison regulations implicate the rights of non-pris-
oners, this fact may influence the courts in weighing and balancing
the rights and competing interests. The Supreme Court, however,
has not established a heightened standard of review for regulations
affecting the privacy rights of non-prisoners.'"
C. Standards of Judicial Review for Prison Regulations
Although incarceration does not completely divest prisoners of
all constitutional rights, the traditional judicial deference to prison
administrators has commonly tipped the balance between penol-
ogical interests and prisoners' rights in favor of prison officials'
limitation of such rights.un This judicial deference has impacted
the standards of judicial review employed in testing the constitu-
tionality of prison regulations.' 62 Traditionally, the Supreme Court
has employed minimum scrutiny in its judicial review of prison
regulations.t 03 Minimum scrutiny merely requires a rational rela-
tionship between the prison regulation and a legitimate penological
95 Id. at 1878 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 84, 94-99).
98 Id.
97 Id. at 1879-80 n.9 (citing Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119, 136
(1977); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)).
98 See supra note 64 for a discussion of cases in which courts upheld the prisoner's right
of marital privacy.
99 See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of judicial balancing of
competing interests.
m See Turner v. Salley, 482 U.S. 78, 97 (1987); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,
409 (1974).
10 ' See, e.g., Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 589 (1984).
' 1" See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546-47 (1979).
10$ See, e.g., Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
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objective.'" The Court has been reluctant to employ a higher level
of scrutiny because of the necessary restraints imposed by incarcer-
ation, restraints that the Court might invalidate if it imposed higher
scrutiny. 105
On some rare occasions, the Supreme Court has employed strict
scrutiny to review prison regulationsi°6 Unlike minimum scrutiny,
strict scrutiny requires a compelling state interest to justify infringe-
ment of a fundamental right or discrimination against a suspect
class.'° 7 The Court has employed such scrutiny only for prison
classifications involving invidious racial discrimination.w8 In the
1968 case of Lee v. Washington, the Court struck down Alabama
statutes requiring segregation of the races in prisons.'" The statutes
required black and white prisoners to be housed in separate areas
of the prisons."° The Court held that the statutes violated the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment because prison of-
ficials had no compelling state interest in separating the white pris-
oners from black prisoners, who represented a suspect racial class."
In addition to such racial classifications, the Court sparingly has
employed heightened scrutiny when prison regulations have impli-
cated fundamental rights of non-prisoners." 2
1 °4 See id.; see also Morales v, Schmidt, 489 F.2d 1335, 1343 (7th Cir. 1973).
to, See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. The Turner Court stated:
Subjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict
scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security
problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison
administration. The rule would also distort the decision-making process, for
every administrative judgment would be subject to the possibility that some
court somewhere would conclude that it had a less restrictive way of solving the
problem at hand. Courts inevitably would become the primary arbiters of what
constitutes the best solution to every administrative problem, thereby "unne-
cessarily perpetuat[ing] the involvement of the federal courts in affairs of prison
administration."
Id.
LOS See, e.g., Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 333 (1968); see also Procunier v. Martinez,
416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974). In Martinez, the Court employed heightened scrutiny to censorship
of prisoner mail, holding that the prison regulation "must further ... one or more of the
substantial governmental interests of security, order, and rehabilitation." Id.
1" See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Intl, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 154 (1973); Lee, 390 U.S. at 333.




112 See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1979); see also infra notes 87-97 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the constitutional rights of non-prisoners.
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In all other cases not involving these few exceptional circum-
stances, courts have employed minimum scrutiny to equal protec-
tion claims that do not implicate fundamental rights or involve
suspect classifications.'" Minimum scrutiny is the standard of review
normally employed by the courts in reviewing social and economic
legislation. 114 As the lowest level of judicial review, minimum scru-
tiny is an easy standard to satisfy because the government must
show merely a rational relationship between a regulation and a
legitimate state purpose.'"
In the 1976 case of French v. Heyne, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit applied minimum scrutiny in hold-
ing that a prisoner classification scheme for participation in voca-
tional programs had no rational basis on its face. " 0 Therefore, the
French court did not dismiss the prisoner's equal protection claim.' 17
In French, an Indiana state prison offered vocational training pro-
grams to those inmates with short indeterminate sentences but not
to inmates with longer indeterminate and determinate sentences.' 18
Moreover, prison officials denied vocational and educational pro-
grams to those inmates already possessing a vocational trade or high
school degree.'" The court applied minimum scrutiny to the pro-
gram, stating that a classification resulting in unequal treatment
need only bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state pur-
pose. 128 The court refused to dismiss the prisoner's equal protection
claim because the prisoner classification had no rational relationship
to a legitimate state purpose.' 2 '
Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit em-
ployed minimum scrutiny in the 1978 case of Durso v. Rowe, holding
that no clear rationale existed for a prison official's denial of a
hearing for an inmate before terminating his work-release status.' 22
Accordingly, the Durso court refused to dismiss the prisoner's equal
" 5 See Durso v. Rowe, 579 F.2d 1365, 1372 (7th Cir, 1978); Nadeau v. Helgemore, 561
F.2d 411, 414 (1st Cir. 1977); French v. Heyne, 547 F.2d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 1976).
"A See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 8.7, at 581-586 (2d ed.
1988) for a discussion of minimum scrutiny applied to social and economic legislation.
"5 See id. at 568-69.
115 French, 547 F.2d at 999, 1002.
" 7 Id.
115 1d. at 99(1.
1191d .
' 2° Id. at 997.
' 21 1d. at 999.
' 22 Durso v. Rowe, 579 F.2d 1365, 1372 (7th Cir. 1978).
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protection claim.' 23 In Durso, a prisoner brought a claim alleging
that prison officials violated his right to equal protection by pur-
posefully denying him a hearing before terminating his work-re-
lease status, even though such hearings were normally provided to
other similarly situated inmates.' 24 Although the court acknowl-
edged that mere inconsistency in prison administration may not
constitute a valid equal protection claim, the court refused to dismiss
the prisoner's claim. 125 The Durso court held that the regulation did
not facially meet minimum scrutiny because the state did not iden-
tify any legitimate state interest.' 26
In contrast, in Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union the
United States Supreme Court held in 1977 that the different clas-
sifications among prisoner groups were rationally related to pen-
ological goals of order and security.' 27 The North Carolina Depart-
ment of Corrections prohibited inmates from holding union
meetings but did not exclude other rehabilitative organizations,
such as Alcoholics Anonymous and the Boy Scouts.'" The Court
noted that, where classifications among prisoners arise from a pen-
ological interest in maintaining order and security in the prisons,
such classifications further a legitimate state interest and do not
violate the equal protection clause.'" Because the Jones Court rea-
soned that order and security in the prison could be undermined
if prisoners were allowed to form a union, the Court concluded that
the exclusion of union meetings furthered a legitimate state interest
in maintaining such order and security.'"
The Supreme Court elaborated on its traditional minimum
scrutiny in reviewing prisoners' claims in the 1987 case of Turner v.
Safley."' In Turner, the Supreme Court.struck down a prison reg-
ulation prohibiting prisoners from marrying other prisoners or
civilians unless the prison superintendent determined that compel-
ling reasons for the marriage existed. t32 The Turner Court employed
12, hi.
124 Id. at 1371.
123 1d. at 1372.
126 Id.
127 433 U.S. 119, 136 (1977).
in Id. at 134.
' 29 Id. at 132; see also Hodges v. Klein, 562 F.2d 276, 278 (3d Cir. 1977).
I50 Jones, 433 U.S. at 132-33. The Jones Court stated: "The case of a prisoners' union,
where the focus is on the presentation of grievances to, and encouragement of adversary
relations with, institution officials surely would rank high on anyone's list of potential trouble
spots." Id. at 133.
13 ' 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987).
ISO Id. at 82. Prison officials did not define the term "compelling" but testified at trial
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a four-part test for minimum scrutiny, which included whether a
valid rational connection exists between the prison regulation and
a legitimate and neutral penological interest put forward to justify
it; alternative means of exercising the right remain open to pris-
oners; an adverse impact on correction employees, other inmates,
or prison resources will result from accommodating the asserted
constitutional right; and, ready alternatives remain available to
prison administrators to address the advanced concerns)" If ob-
vious, easy alternatives exist, then the Court will regard the regu-
lation as an exaggerated response to prison concerns)" The Court
held that the marital regulation in Turner failed this four-part test) 35
Of particular concern to the Court was the lack of a rational con-
nection between the regulation and the purported penological in-
terests of security and rehabilitation)"
The Supreme Court subsequently has employed the Turner test
of minimum scrutiny in its review of prison regulations) 37 This
most recent standard of review reflects the still-present judicial
deference to prison administrators, who merely need to demon-
strate a reasonable relationship between a prison regulation and a
legitimate penological objective)" The judicial requirement of
merely legitimate, not important or compelling, state interests in
this regard results in a balancing of competing interests that favor
the correctional system and oppose prisoners' rights. Despite this
implicit deference toward prison officials, however, the Turner test
provides some specific, albeit limited, guidelines in balancing pen-
ological interests against the constitutional rights of prisoners.
II. THE IMPACT OF AIDS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY RIGHTS OF PRISONERS
Special considerations arise in the judicial balancing of com-
peting interests where prison regulations involve AIDS. The grow-
ing presence of AIDS in prisons creates special problems for prison
officials, who now must view traditional penological objectives
that compelling reasons would generally be restricted to a pregnancy or the birth of an
illegitimate child. Id.
153 Id. at 89-91.
134 1d. at 90-91.
155 /d. at 99.
LSO Id. at 98-99,
137 See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. 1874, 1882 (1989); O'Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987).
138 See Turner v. Salley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
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through the realities of AiDS.' 39 The formulation of new policies
and regulations to respond to the AIDS crisis has significant impact
on the constitutional and statutory rights of prisoners and their
families.
A. Constitutional Rights of AIDS-Infected Prisoners
Prisoners are entitled to certain protections under the four-
teenth amendment of the Constitution.' 4° The increasing incidence
of AIDS in prisons, 141 however, has challenged the already tenuous
status of prisoners' constitutional rights.' 42
 Prison administrators
have been faced with formulating appropriate policies concerning
prevention, identification, treatment and institutional management
of AIDS, and with balancing the competing interests of legitimate
penological objectives against the special needs of prisoners with
AlDS.' 43
 These policies have included the segregation and confine-
ment of prisoners with AIDS and mandatory HIV testing of pris-
oners.' 44 The constitutional implications of these policies and reg-
ulations have resulted in lawsuits initiated by both AIDS-infected
and A1DS-free prisoners.' 45
Prisoners' lawsuits have included equal protection claims arising
from special conditions imposed on them because of their having
AIDS.' 46 For example, in the 1984 case of Cordero v. Coughlin, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
denied the equal protection claim of prisoners with AIDS because
they were not similarly situated to other prisoners.' 47 In Cordero, a
group of segregated state prisoners with AIDS sued the state's
150
	 Cordero v. Coughlin, 607 F. Supp. 9, 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
14" See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of the constitutional
rights of prisoners.
141 See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
'" See Moriarity, AIDS in Correctional Institutions: The Legal Aspects, 23 CRIM. L. Bw.L. 533,
535 (1987); see also Traufier v. Thompson, 662 F. Supp. 945, 946 (N.D. III. 1987). The
Traufler court statecrin dicta that "AIDS unquestionably is a serious public health problem
that is impacting on our nation's prisons. To stern its spread among the inmate population,
prison administrators undoubtedly will have to make delicate policy decisions that will have
some constitutional implications." Id.
147 See Comment, AIDS Behind Bars, supra note 14, at 336, 351-52. According to some
commentators, prison administrators have imposed restrictive responses to AIDS because of
their fear of liability to prisoners or prison employees who contract the disease. See id. at
347-51 and Moriarity, supra note 142, at 545-48 for discussions of prison liability and AIDS.
14 ' See T. 11AmmErr, supra note 3, at 47.
14 ' Id.
146 See Moriarity, supra note 142, at 537.
147 607 F. Supp. 9, 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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Department of Correctional Services, alleging, among other things,
that they were deprived of social, recreational and rehabilitative
opportunities by being medically segregated and, thereby, denied
equal protection of the law.'" The Corder() court held that the
prisoners were not denied equal protection of the law.'" Alterna-
tively, the court stated in dicta that, even if the equal protection
clause did apply, individuals with AIDS do not constitute a suspect
class and, therefore, the court would employ minimum scrutiny, 15°
This standard requires correctional services merely to show a ra-
tional relationship between the segregation and a legitimate gov-
ernment end."' The Cordero court stated that the protection of both
prisoners with AIDS and other prisoners from the tensions and
harms that might arise from fear surrounding AIDS was a legiti-
mate government end. 152 Accordingly, the court concluded that the
prisoner classification would meet the minimum scrutiny standard
if the court applied the equal protection clause.'"
Although courts have generally ruled against prisoners' alleged
claims of violations of privacy under the fourteenth amendment,'"
some courts have upheld AIDS-infected prisoners' right of privacy
regarding their medical records and HIV status.' 55 In the 1988 case
of Woods v. White, the United States District Court for the Western
District of Wisconsin held that prisoners' privacy rights include non-
disclosure of their medical records to other prison personnel.' 58 In
Woods, prison medical service personnel disclosed to non-medical
staff and other inmates the fact that a prison inmate had tested
positive for the AIDS virus."' The Woods court held that prisoners
retain some constitutional right to privacy despite incarceration. 158
The court further noted that the constitutional right to privacy







1" See supra notes 58-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of prisoners' right to
privacy under the fourteenth amendment.
1"See Rodriguez v. Coughlin, No. C1V-87-1577E, 1, 6-7 (W.D.N.Y. June 5, 1989)
(WESTLAW, Allfeds library); Doe v. Coughlin, 697 F. Supp. 1239, 1240-41 (N.D.N.Y. 1988);
Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874, 876 (W.D. Wis. 1988).
156 Woods, 689 F. Supp. at 876.
157 Id. at 874-75.
15 " Id. at 876 (quoting Torres v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health and Social Servs., 538 F.2d
999, 951 (7th Cir. 1988)).
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mation, a right that must be balanced against the governmental
interest in limited disclosure.' 59 Finally, the Woods court held that
no countervailing governmental interest existed in the disclosure
by prison medical service personnel of the prisoner's HIV-positive
status to non-medical staff and other inmates, and, as a result, the
prisoner retained the right to non-disclosure of his medical rec-
ords. 16°
In another case involving an AIDS-infected prisoner's right to
privacy, the United States District Court for the Northern District
of New York held in 1988 in Doe v. Coughlin that prisoners were
entitled to a preliminary injunction enjoining their further invol-
untary transfer to a segregated dormitory for prisoners who were
HIV-positive.' 6 ' The court reasoned that prisoners who are HIV-
positive are entitled to some protection against non-consensual dis-
closure of their status.' 62 At the same time, the court required the
prisoners to demonstrate that the right to privacy existed and that
the program in question was not reasonably related to a legitimate
penological objective. 163 The Doe court held that prisoners' consti-
tutional rights were violated by their inability to choose whether
they wished to be placed in the special dormitory for those who
were HIV-positive.'"
Similarly, in the 1989 case of Rodriguez v. Coughlin, the United
States District Court for the Western District of New York held that
an AIDS-infected prisoner stated a valid constitutional claim re-
garding the alleged infringement upon his privacy by corrections
officers. 165 In Rodriguez, corrections officers entirely enveloped an
AIDS-infected inmate in a hygiene suit when they transferred him
from a prison hospital to the main prison facility.' 66 The inmate
protested his wearing the suit because he was afraid that it would
conspicuously identify him to other prisoners as having AIDS.'"
His fears proved well-founded because, prior to corrections officers
assigning him a cell, two inmates threatened to harm or kill him.' 68
1 " Id.
I" Id.
161 697 F. Supp. 1234, 1243 (N.D.N.Y. 1988).
162 Id. at 1238.
126 1d. at 1236. The district court described the right to privacy argument as the "less
traveled path marked by the uncertain borders of the constitutionally protected right to
privacy." Id.
' 64 Id. at 1241, 1243.
166 No. C1V-87-1577E, 1, 4, 8-9 (W.D.N.Y. June 5, 1989) (WESTLAW, Allfeds library).
166 Id. at 2,
167 /d. at 3.
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Further, while he was incarcerated in two different prison dorms,
corrections officers informed various inmates that he had A1DS.' 69
The court noted that the significant incidence of AIDS in prisons
presents legal issues, some of which have constitutional dimen-
sions.'" The court delineated one such legal issue to be the pris-
oner's right of privacy regarding his AIDS status."' Applying the
reasoning of Doe v. Coughlin and Woods v. White, the Rodriguez court
stated that information about the disease of AIDS is of the most
personal kind and that an individual has a strong interest in pro-
tecting against the disclosure of this information to others. 172 As a
result, the court held that the prisoner stated a valid claim regarding
the alleged violation of his right to privacy when prison officers
informed other inmates that he suffered from AIDS."s
Although courts traditionally have limited the constitutional
rights of prisoners in favor of countervailing penological interests,
some courts have recognized that penological interests cannot al-
ways justify infringement upon the privacy rights of AIDS-infected
prisoners. 14 Increasingly, courts seem to be upholding the right of
privacy of inmates with AIDS to confidentiality in their medical
records and HIV status. 175 In weighing the competing interests
between prison officials and AIDS-infected prisoners, some courts
have affirmed the prisoners' privacy rights in the absence of legiti-
mate penological interests that justify infringement upon those
rights.' 76
B. Statutory Rights of AIDS-Infected Prisoners: Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973
In addition to constitutional protection under the fourteenth
amendment, AIDS-infected prisoners may be entitled to statutory
w°
170 Id. at 4.
171 Id. at 7.
," Id. at 6-7.
173 Id. at 3. Other courts have dismissed as frivolous claims brought by prisoners for the
failure of prison officials to protect them from other inmates with AIDS. See Glick v. Hen-
derson, 855 F.2d 536, 539 (8th Cir. 1988); Traufler v. Thompson, 662 F. Supp. 945, 946-
47 (N.D. III. 1987); Jarrett v. Faulkner, 662 F. Supp. 928, 929 (S.D. Ind. 1987). These courts
have held that such suits arise from unsubstantiated fears that do not justify wholesale AIDS
testing and segregation. See Click, 855 F.2d at 539; Traufler, 662 F. Supp. at 946-47; Parrett,
662 F. Supp. at 929,
174 See Rodriguez v. Coughlin, No. C1V-87-1577E, 1, 7 (W.D.N.Y. June 5, 1989) (WEST-
LAW, Allfeds library); Doe v. Coughlin, 697 F. Supp. 1234, 1240-41 (N.D.N.Y. 1988).
175 See Rodriguez, No. C1V-87-1577E at 8; Doe, 697 F. Supp. at 1243.
176 See Rodriguez, No. CIV-87-1577E at 8; Doe, 697 F. Supp. at 1243.
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protection under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973) 77
Section 504 prohibits discrimination in federally assisted programs
against otherwise qualified individuals with handicaps solely on the
basis of the handicaps. 178 The evaluation of a section 504 claim
requires a four-part inquiry that includes whether the individual is
handicapped within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act; whether
the individual with handicaps is otherwise qualified to participate
in the program; whether the handicap was the sole reason for
exclusion from the program; and whether the program in question
is a recipient of federal funds.'"
In evaluating a section 504 claim, the court must first determine
if the individual claimant is handicapped within the meaning of the
Rehabilitation Act. 1 "D Although the Supreme Court has not held
L77 Section 504 is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 706(8)(C), 794 (1988).
178 Section 504 provides in pertinent part:
No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps in the United States, as defined
in section 706(7) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his [or her] handicap, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subject to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
tance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency of
the United States .
Id.
In 1974, the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare and the House Committee
on Labor and Education determined that "certain clarifying and perfecting changes in the
Act would be required in order to permit the full implementation of Congressional intent:"
Baxley, Rehabilitating AIDS-Based Employment Discrimination: HIV Infection As A Handicap Under
The Vocational Rehabilitation Act Of 1973, 19 SETON HALL L. REV. 23, 35 (1989) (quoting S.
REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 38, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Cone CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
6373, 6376-77). Congress amended the definition of a handicapped individual because of a
statement in a Senate report that the definition had been too limited in its orientation toward
employment and vocational rehabilitation services. Baxley, supra, at 35. The report stated:
It was clearly the intent of the Congress in adopting section 503 (affirmative
action) and section 504 (nondiscrimination) that the term "handicapped indi-
vidual" in those sections was not to be narrowly limited to employment (in the
case of section 504), nor to the individual's potential benefit from vocational
rehabilitation services ... (in the case of both sections 503 and 504) of the Act
. . . [A) test of discrimination against a handicapped individual under section
504 should not be couched either in terms of whether such individual's disability
is a handicap to employment, or whether such individual can reasonably be
expected to benefit, in terms of employment, from vocational rehabilitation
services. Such a test is irrelevant to the many forms of potential discrimination
covered by section 504.
S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 38, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. Sc ADMIN. News
6373, 6388.
179 See Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 230 (3d Cir. 1983); Doe v. New
York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 774-75 (2d Cir. 1981).
is° See School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 280 (1987); Strathie, 716 F.2d at 230; Doe, 666
F.2d at 774-75.
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expressly that individuals with AIDS are protected under the Re-
habilitation Act,' 81 the Court held in the 1987 case of School Board
v. Arline that contagious diseases are handicaps under the Rehabil-
itation Act.' 82 In 1988, Congress amended the statutory definition
of individuals with handicaps to include those with contagious dis-
eases. 1 e" As a result of these legislative and judicial actions, courts
increasingly have found AIDS-infected individuals to be handi-
capped within the meaning of section 504. 184
For example, in the 1988 case of Chalk v. United States District
Court, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a teacher
with AIDS is a handicapped person under the Rehabilitation Act. 1 e"
A school district fired Chalk as a teacher and reinstated him in a
non-teaching position because he had AIDS. 186 The Chalk court
granted a preliminary injunction to reinstate Chalk in the classroom,
stating that he demonstrated a strong probability of success on the
merits of his section 504 claim.'"
Once the court determines that the individual is handicapped,
it must find the handicapped individual otherwise qualified under
the Rehabilitation Act.'" The Supreme Court has held that an
otherwise qualified person is one who meets all of a program's
requirements despite the handicap.' 89 Where the handicapped con-
dition is a contagious disease, the Supreme Court noted in School
Board v. Arline that courts should engage in an individualized inquiry
to determine if the individual is otherwise qualified.' 90 This indivi-
dualized inquiry includes an assessment of the nature of the risk,
the duration of the risk, the severity of the risk, and the probability
'HI Arline, 480 U.S. at 282 11.7.
, m 2
 id. at 289.
1 " See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, 29 U.S.C. §§ 706(8)(C), 794(6) (1988). The
Act states in pertinent part:
ISluch term does not include an individual who has a currently contagious
disease or infection and who, by reason of such disease or infection, would
constitute a direct. threat to the health or safety of other individuals or who, by
reason of the currently contagious disease or infection, is unable to perform
the duties of the job.
Id.
'" See Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701, 709 (9th Cir. 1988); District 27
Community School Bd. v. Board of Hue., 130 Misc. 2d 398, 414, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325, 336
(Sup. Ct. 1986).
I" 840 F.2d at 709.
1M Id. at 703.
187 Id. at 709, 712.
'" See School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287-88 (1987).
I" See Southeastern Community College. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979).
'"'l 480 U.S. at 287.
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of transmission and resultant harm."' The significance of the risk
of transmission is the particularly significant element in this indi-
vidualized inquiry. 192
 Courts have held that a significant risk of
transmission may exist when the infected person places others at
definite, not theoretical, risk of transmission of the contagious dis-
ease.' 93
In the 1987 case of Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School District,
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
held that an HIV-infected child was otherwise qualified to attend
kindergarten.'" In Thomas, the parents of a child alleged that their
school district had prohibited their HIV-infected son from attend-
ing regular kindergarten classes.' 95
 The court found no evidence
that the child posed any significant risk of transmission to other
children or teachers.' 96 Therefore, the Thomas court held that sec-
tion 504 protected the child from the discriminatory actions of the
school because he was otherwise qualified under the Rehabilitation
Act. 197 As a result, the court granted a preliminary injunction pro-
hibiting the school district from excluding the HIV-infected child
from the classroom. 198
Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Chalk
employed the significant risk standard in determining whether the
AIDS-infected school teacher was otherwise qualified for his posi-
tion. 199
 The court noted that no evidence existed of any significant
risk of transmission of the AIDS virus by the AIDS-infected teacher
in the school setting. 200 Further, the Chalk court concluded that
every theoretical possibility of risk need not be disproved. 2°'
The Supreme Court has held that where a handicapped person
presents a significant risk of transmission, the person is not other-
1 " 1
 Id. at 288.
192 Id. at 287 n.16.
193 See Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376, 380 (C.D. Cal.
1987); District 27 Community School Bd. v. Board of Educ., 130 Misc. 2d 398, 413, 502
N.Y.S.2d 325, 337 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
' 91 662 F. Supp. at 381.
'" Id.
196 Id.
Ig7 Id. at 381-82.
196
 Id. at 382.
' 99 Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701, 707 (9th Cir. 1988).
200 Id.
2" 1 Id. at 709; see also District 27 Community School Bd. v. Board of Educ., 130 Misc, 2d
398, 413, 415, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325, 335, 337 (Sup. Ct. 1986). The court in District 27 noted
that routine precautions can significantly reduce any theoretical risk of transmission of the
AIDS virus. Id.
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wise qualified unless reasonable accommodation can eliminate the
significant risk. 202 The Court has also noted that accommodation is
not reasonable if it either results in undue financial and adminis-
trative burden to the program or fundamentally alters the nature
of the program. 203 In the 1979 case of Southeastern Community College
v. Davis, the Supreme Court held that a community college's refusal
to make major adjustments in its nursing program to accommodate
a hearing impaired licensed practical nurse was not discrimina-
tory. 204 The Davis Court stated that such accommodation would
impose undue burdens upon the college and lower or modify the
standards of its nursing program. 203 The Court concluded that the
nurse was not otherwise qualified because the college could not
reasonably accommodate her handicap in its program. 206 Thus, a
handicapped individual is not otherwise qualified if the program
cannot reasonably accommodate the handicap.
If the court finds a handicapped individual to be otherwise
qualified, the individual must show that his or her exclusion from
the program was based solely on the handicap. 201 Where program
officials explicitly state that the individual was excluded because of
the handicap, the handicapped individual has met this element of
a section 504 claim. For example, courts have held that AIDS-
infected individuals have met this element of their section 504 claim
where program officials admit that their exclusion of such individ-
uals is based solely on their haying AIDS:2°8
Lastly, a court must determine whether the program in ques-
tion receives federal funds. 209 In 1988, Congress enacted the Civil
Rights Restoration Act of 1987 (the Restoration Act)21 ° to restore
212 See School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.17 (1987); Southeastern Community
College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410-12 (1979).
2"' See Arline, 480 U.S. at 287 n.17; Davis, 442 U.S. at 412.
204 442 U.S. at 413.
205 Id.
2" Id, at 414.
217 See Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 230 (3d Cir. 1983); Doe v. New
York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 774 (2d Cir. 1981).
218 See, e.g., Doe v. Centinela Hosp., No. CV 87-2514 PAR (PX), 1, 10 (C.D. Cal. June
30, 1988) (WESTLAW, Allfeds library) (H1V positive patient in residential alcohol and drug
rehabilitation program excluded solely because of Fl I V status); District 27 Community School
Bd. v. Board of Educ., 130 Misc, 2c1 398, 413, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325, 335 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (court
noted in dicta that "automatic exclusion from school of all children with AIDS would violate
their rights under the Rehabilitation Act").
41B I n pertinent part, 29 U.S.C. section 794 states that section 504 applies to "any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C.
§ 794 (1988).
410 Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (codified as
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the broad range of institution-wide coverage of section 504 that the
United States Supreme Court had narrowed since the promulgation
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 211 The Restoration Act defines
" program or activity" to include, among other things, all the oper-
ations of a department or agency of the state, rather than only
specific programs or activities. 212 In effect, the Restoration Act en-
sures broad, institution-wide application of section 504 to include
all programs of a state department that receives federal financial
assistance.
Since the enactment of the Restoration Act, courts have held
that individual programs do not have to be specific recipients of
federal funds as long as the broader institution itself is a federal
recipient. 213 For example, in Bonner v. Arizona Department of Correc-
tions, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona in
1989 held that section 504 applies to prisoners incarcerated in state
prisons. 2 " In Bonner, a deaf, mute, and vision-impaired inmate at
the Arizona State Prison brought a section 504 claim against the
prison for its alleged failure to provide him with a qualified inter-
preter. 215 The court rejected the Department of Corrections' con-
tention that the inmate did not have a viable claim under section
504 because no nexus existed between the Department's federal
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 706(8)(C), 794(b) (1988)). The purpose of the Act is to "Mestere
the broad scope of coverage and to clarify the application of . . . section 504 of the Rehabil-
itation Act of 1973." Id. The Restoration Act further states:
(1) certain aspects of recent decisions and opinions of the Supreme Court have
unduly narrowed or cast doubt upon [its] broad application and (2) legislative
action is necessary to restore the prior consistent and long-standing executive
branch interpretation and broad, institution-wide application of those laws as
previously administered.
Id.
711 See, e.g., Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 636 (1984) (Court stated
that section 504 was limited to the "specific program that receives federal funds"); Grove
City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1984) (Court stated that section 501(a) of Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which prohibited sex discrimination in "any
education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance," was limited to the
particular program or activity receiving such assistance).
2" The Restoration Act states in relevant part that "Mor the purposes of this section,
the term 'program or activity' means all of the operations of . a department, agency, special
purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or of a local government .... " 29 U.S.C.
§ 794 (b)(l)(A) (1988).
2" See, e.g., Leake v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 695 F. Supp. 1414, aff'd, 869
F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1989); Bonner v. Arizona Dept of Corrections, 714 F. Supp. 420 (D. Ariz.
1989). In Leake and Bonner, the courts held that the Restoration Act applied retroactively.
Leake, 869 F.2d at 131; Bonner, 714 F. Supp. at 422.
214 714 F. Supp. at 422.
2""
	 at 420.
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funds and the programs in which the inmate sought to partici-
pate. 2 '" The Bonner court applied the Restoration Act in noting that
the term "program or activity" under section 504 encompasses all
the operations of a department that receives federal funds. 217 Be-
cause the Arizona Department of Corrections admitted that it re-
ceived federal assistance, the court held that section 504 applied
and that the inmate therefore was entitled to auxiliary aids for
participation in all the Department's operations. 213
Even prior to the enactment of the Restoration Act, some courts
had held that section 504 applied not only to state departments that
received federal funds but to individual components within the
departments as wel1. 21 • For example, courts had held that local
school districts under state departments of education were recipi-
ents of federal funds under the Rehabilitation Act. 22° These state
departments of education distributed federal funds to local school
districts, which then had to comply with the obligations of section
504.221 Courts have noted that local school districts that excluded
AIDS-infected students or teachers are federal recipients, and,
therefore, must comply with the Rehabilitation Act. 222 In line with
such cases, the Restoration Act defines the term "program or activ-
ity" broadly to ensure institution-wide coverage of section 504 for
handicapped individuals seeking protection under the Rehabilita-
tion Act.
Once the handicapped individual meets the four elements of a
section 504 claim, the handicapped individual has established a
prima facie case of handicap discrimination. 223 The program then
216 Id. at 421.
217 Id. at 422.
218 Id. The Banner court applied the Restoration Act retroactively, adopting the reasoning
of Leake v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center, which has been the only other federal district
court case to examine the question "whether Congress intended the Civil Rights Restoration
Act to be applied retroactively to cases that were pending at the time of its passage." Bonner,
714 F. Supp. at 422.
119 See, e.g., Association for Retarded Citizens v. Frazier, 517 F. Supp. 105, 119-20 (D.
Colo. 1981) (court regarded State Department of Education as the recipient of federal funds
for purposes of section 504, which it distributed to local educational agencies, and, therefore,
these agencies fell under the obligations of section 504); District 27 Community School Bd.
v. Board of Educ., 130 Misc. 2d 398, 414, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325, 336 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
220 See, e.g., Association for Retarded Citizens, 517 F. Supp. at 119-20; District 27 Community
School Bd., 130 Misc. 2d at 414, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 336.
221 See, e.g., District 27 Community School Bd., 130 Misc. 2d at 414, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 336.
222 See id.
223 See Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 776-77 (2d Cir. 1981); Pushkin v. Regents
of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1387 (10th Cir. 1981).
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has the burden of demonstrating either that the handicapped per-
son was not otherwise qualified because of the handicap or that
exclusion from the program was for reasons other than the hand-
icap. 224
 Courts have held that this burden of proof requires more
rigorous scrutiny than the mere minimum scrutiny applied to many
constitutional claims. 226
 If the recipient meets this burden, the hand-
icapped individual then has the ultimate burden of showing that
the recipient's reasons for excluding him or her from the program
are pretextual. 226
To date, prisoners with AIDS have raised section 504 claims
only on rare occasions. In the 1987 case of Judd v. Packard, the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland held that
an HIV-infected inmate had no claim under section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. 227 In Judd, a prisoner alleged that his placement
in medical isolation for testing, diagnosis and treatment of an AIDS-
related condition was an act of discrimination on the basis of a
handicap. 228
 The court held that Judd did not demonstrate any
relationship between the alleged discrimination by prison officials
and any specific federally-funded program. 229
 Therefore, the court
dismissed his statutory claim. 230 The Judd court decided this case,
however, prior to the enactment and subsequent interpretation by
the courts of the Restoration Act, which was designed to ensure
institution-wide, not merely program-specific, application of section
504 to federal recipients. 23 '
44'
	 Doe, 666 F.2d at 776-77; Pushkin, 658 F.2d at 1387.
225 See Doe, 666 F.2d at 776-77; Pushkin, 658 F.2d at 1387.
226 See Pushkin, 658 F.2d at 1383-84; Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227,
231 (3d Cir. 1983); Bentivegna v. United States Dept of Labor, 694 F.2d 619, 621 (9th Cir.
1982).
222
 Judd v. Packard, 669 F. Supp. 741, 742 (D. Md. 1987).
2" Id.
229 Id.
2" Id. at 743.
251 See supra notes 210-213 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Restoration
Act. In light of the Restoration Act and its subsequent judicial application in Bonner v. Arizona
Dep't. of Corrections, the Judd court likely would have reached a different result if the AIDS-
infected prisoner had brought his section 504 claim after the enactment of the Restoration
Act. In Bonner, the court stated:
Itihe Act's goals of independent living and vocational rehabilitation should in
fact mirror the goals of prison officials as they attempt to rehabilitate prisoners
and prepare them to lead productive lives once their sentences are complete.
By ensuring that inmates have meaningful access to prison activities, such as
disciplinary proceedings and counseling, the goals of both the institution and
the Rehabilitation Act are served.
857 F.2d 559, 562 (9th Cir. 1988).
July 1990]	 PRISONERS WITH AIDS	 993
Although AIDS-infected prisoners rarely have raised section
504 claims, the statute does prohibit discrimination against handi-
capped persons participating in federally-funded institutions. 2 i 2
Courts have held that AIDS as a contagious disease is a protected
handicap under section 504 and that AIDS-infected individuals may
be otherwise qualified to participate in such programs. 2" Moreover,
courts have considered state prisons that have received federal fi-
nancial assistance to be subject to the obligations of section 504. 234
Thus, section 504 provides statutory protection for AIDS-infected
individuals, including state prisoners, from discrimination in fed-
erally-funded institutions.
1. FAMILY VISITATION PROGRAMS AND RIGHTS OF PRISONERS
wall AIDS
Prison officials have denied prisoners with AIDS meaningful
access to social, recreational and rehabilitation programs. 2" Such
denial of access has been due, in part, to the seclusion and segre-
gation of AIDS-infected prisoners in isolation units of prisons. 23"
Although relatively few prisons totally exclude segregated inmates
with AIDS from all programs, access has been limited, particularly
with respect to conjugal visitation programs. 2"
232 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C: §§ 706(8)(C), 794 (1988). See also supra note
178 for text of the statute.
2" See supra notes 184-201 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases in which
courts held that AIDS-infected individuals were otherwise qualified handicapped individuals
under section 504.
23' See Bonner, 714 F. Supp. at 422. In Bonner, the court cited United States Department
of justice regulations promulgated under section 504 that apply to federally assisted correc-
tional institutions. Id. at 423. The regulations require those institutions to
"Ip)rovide appropriate auxiliary aids to qualified handicapped persons with impaired sensory,
manual, or speaking skills where refusal to make such provision would discriminatorily impair
or exclude the participation of such persons." 28 C.F.R. § 42.503(f) (1988). Thus, the
Department of Justice has acknowledged the application of section 509 to correctional insti-
tutions receiving federal financial assistance.
235 See T. HAMMETT, supra note 3, at 36.
2s"
	 Cordero v. Coughlin, 607 F. Supp. 9, 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
237 In an October, 1988 survey of state prisons regarding segregated prisoners with AIDS,
only 5% of the prisons provided full access to conjugal visits, 3% provided limited access,
and 79% (incomplete responses) provided no access. See T. HAMMETP, Housing and Correctional
Management Policies, in 1988 UPDATE: AIDS IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES I, 36-37 (1989).
For asymptomatic HIV carriers, state prisons provided 23% full access, 0% limited access,
and 69% (incomplete responses) no access. Id. For city and county jails in the same survey,
12% provided full access, 6% limited access, and 65% (incomplete responses) no access for
prisoners with AIDS. Id. For asymptomatic HIV carriers, 13% of city and county jails
provided full access, 63% limited access, and 0% (incomplete responses) no access. Id.
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A. Family Visitation Programs in Prisons
To date, ten states have implemented family visitation pro-
grams in their prison systems. 2"8
 At least one state, Connecticut,
allows prisoners with AIDS to participate in conjugal visits. 239 Family
visitation programs allow prisoners and their spouses to visit pri-
vately and engage in family interaction, including sexual rela-
tions.240
 Program goals include preserving marital and family rela-
tionships, reducing homosexual activity, and offering other
2'8 See supra note 17 for a list of these ten states. See also Hopper, The Conjugal Visit at
Mississippi State Penitentiary, 53 J. GRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 340, 341 (1962).
Mississippi was the First state to allow conjugal visits. Correctional officials first implemented
such visits at the Mississippi State Prison Farm in Parchman in 1944. Id. at 341; see also Jacobs
& Steele, Sexual Deprivation and Penal Polity, 62 CORNELI. L. REV. '289, 298, 304 (1977).
California first allowed conjugal visits at the California Correctional Institution at Tehachapi
in 1968, and eventually expanded such visits to all of its state prisons. Id. Florida established
conjugal visits in 1971, and New York followed suit in 1976. Id. See also Hayner, Attitudes
Toward Conjugal Visits for Prisoners, FED. PROBATION 43, 48-49 (1971) for a description of
conjugal visits in Latin American countries.
"9 See Appellants' Brief, Exhibit 4, Doe v. Coughlin, 71 N.Y.2d 48, 518 N.E.2d 536, 523
N.Y.S.2d 782 (1987) (No. 5402), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 196 (1988). The Medical Director of
the Connecticut Department of Correction wrote to Ms. Deborah Schneer, legal counsel for
John Doe in Doe v. Coughlin, regarding conjugal visits for prisoners with AIDS in the
Connecticut correctional system. His letter stated in part:
With regard to inmates that are known to be positive for the AIDS virus antibody
test, it is assumed that they are all capable of transmitting this virus sexually.
Our protocol in Connecticut when such an inmate is scheduled for a trailer
visit, is for myself, as Medical Director, to personally interview all family mem-
bers participating in this visit. The risk of transmitting AIDS virus with intimate
contact (sexual, shooting drugs, prolonged oral contact) is thoroughly discussed.
When 1 am satisfied that the participants have been fully informed and under-
stand the risk of AIDS virus transmission, a standard release form, again out-
lining these risks, is signed by those family members. The trailer visit may then
take place as scheduled.
Id.
2' 0 See Hayner, supra note 238, at 48. Lawrence E. Wilson, former deputy director of the
California Department of Corrections, stated that family visitation programs are an:
la1ttempt by California prison administrators to provide an opportunity for the
inmate to visit his wife and children in a relaxed normal-like family setting....
California wants family visiting aimed at preserving the family relationship and
helping families grow stronger. The fact that husbands and wives engage in
sexual intercourse is incidental to our main objective: the preservation and
strengthening of the family.
Id.; we also Hingislo v. Mercure, 72 A.D.2d 850, 851, 421 N.Y.S.2d 690, 693 (1979) (noting
in dicta that pursuant to section 70 (Subd. 2) of the Correction Law, the Family Reunion
Program was a program designed "to assist sentenced persons to live as law abiding citizens").
The purpose of the Family Reunion Program in the New York State prison system is further
defined in its governing regulations: "The goal of the program is to preserve, enhance and
strengthen family ties that have been disrupted as a result of incarceration." N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & RECS. tit. 7, § 220.1 (1983).
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potential rehabilitative benefits to prisoners. 24 ' Prison officials' de-
nial of participation in conjugal visits may undermine the rehabili-
tation of prisoners, resulting in the deprivation of important emo-
tional support, the weakening of family ties, and physiological
frustration. 242
Courts have consistently refused to recognize any constitutional
right of prisoners to conjugal visits. 243 In the 1974 case of Lyons v.
Gilligan, the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Ohio held that the constitutional right of marital privacy does
not require prison officials to grant conjugal visits to prisoners and
their spouses. 244 In Lyons, state prisoners and their wives brought
an action against prison officials for depriving them of conjugal
visits, alleging that the deprivation was a denial of marital privacy. 245
The Lyons court held that the Constitution does not impose an
affirmative duty on the state to create private places for sexual
relations between prisoners and their spouses. 246 The court con-
cluded that the absence of conjugal visits does not infringe upon
the prisoner's right of privacy. 247
Similarly, in the 1984 case of Mary of Oakknoll v. Coughlin, the
New York Supreme Court held that no constitutional right to con-
jugal visits exists in state prisons.248 In Mary of Oakknoll, a prisoner
and his alleged wife brought a claim against prison officials for
denying them participation in conjugal visits because they did not
have a valid marriage license. 24" The court noted that conjugal visits
241 See Rayner, supra note 238, at 48. In a survey conducted by Or, Columbus Hopper
at the Parchman State Prison in Mississippi, 50% of the prisoners who participated in conjugal
visits noted "keeping marriages from breaking up" as the most helpful result of conjugal
visits, Id. In California, many of the wives of prisoners at Tehachapi State Prison had
expressed ID staff that they were not sure they wanted to continue their marriage, After
Family visits, their marriage strengthened, and they decided against separation. Id. at 49. See
also In re Cummings, 30 Cal. 3d 870, 874, 640 P.2d 1101, 1103, 180 Cal. Rptr, 826, 828
(1982). The Supreme Court of California noted that the social purpose of conjugal visits is
to preserve family unity, and that prisoners and family members, "bonded by legally recog-
nized ties, benefit from a generally laudable and humane attempt to preserve these ties
during incarceration." Id.
242 See Note, Conjugal Visitalion Rights, supra note 63, at 417.
212 See Lyons v, Gilligan, 382 F. Supp. 198, 201-02 (N.D. Ohio 1974); In re Mary of
Oakknoll v. Coughlin, 101 A.D.2d 931, 932, 475 N.Y.S.2d 644, 646 (1973).
244 382 F. Supp. at 203.
242 Id. at 199.
24" Id. at 200.
247 Id .
24" 101 A.D.2d at 932, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
249 Id. at 932, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 645.
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are a privilege, not a right. 25° The court concluded that prison
officials rationally required a marriage license as a prerequisite for
participation in conjugal visits in order to promote administrative
convenience and efficiency. 25 '
Courts also have limited the constitutional rights of spouses and
other family members implicated in family visitation programs in
the prisons. 252 One court held that the spouse of a prisoner had no
valid claim in asserting that refusal of conjugal visits with her inmate
spouse violated her due process rights. 253 Another court found that
the spouse of a prisoner was not entitled to the same incidents of
marriage that she had prior to the incarceration of her husband,
because of the nature of incarceration. 254 These cases, however, pre-
date the United States Supreme Court case of Turner v. Salley, which
recognized that many of the incidents of marriage still remain in
the prison setting. 255
Courts have granted prison officials broad discretion in for-
mulating policies and regulations regarding conjugal visits• 256 With
respect to AIDS-infected prisoners, courts rarely have reviewed the
constitutional and statutory implications of such prisoners' partici-
pation in or exclusion from conjugal visits. 257 Although courts have
been willing to protect prisoners' privacy rights in other circum-
stances, including confidentiality of medical records and HIV sta-
tus, 258 only one case to date has addressed the privacy rights of
AIDS-infected prisoners in family visitation programs. 259
B. The Exclusion of Prisoners with AIDS from Family Visitation
Programs: Doe v. Coughlin
In the 1987 case of Doe v. Coughlin, the New York Court of
Appeals held that a prisoner with AIDS could be denied partici-
250 Id. at 932, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
251 Id.
252 See Payne v. District of Columbia, 253 F.2d 867, 868 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Mary of Oakknoll,
10l A.D.2d at 932-33, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
255
 Payne, 253 F.2d at 868.
254 See Mary of Oakknoll, l01 A.D.2d at 932-33, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
"' See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of Turner.
2" See, e.g., Mary of Oakknoll, 101 A.D.2d at 932, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
252 But see Doe v. Coughlin, 71 N.Y.2d 48, 48, 518 N.E.2d 536, 536, 523 N.Y.S.2d 782,
782 (1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 196 (1988) (noting that AIDS-infected prisoner was not
entitled to conjugal visits).
25"
	 supra notes 155-173 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases in which
courts upheld certain privacy rights of AI DS-infected prisoners.
252 See Doe, 71 N.Y.2d at 48, 518 N.E,2d at 536, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 782.
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pation in a family visitation program. 26° In October, 1985, the pris-
oner, John Doe, qualified for participation in the Family Reunion
Program at Auburn Correctional Facility and, subsequently, he and
his wife participated in the program for the first time and completed
a two-day conjugal visit on prison grounds. 26 ' In December of the
same year, John Doe was diagnosed with AIDS, and the prison
placed him in a hospital unit. 262 Prison officials allowed his wife to
visit with her husband but required that he sit in a chair in the
doorway of the isolation room while his wife sat in the hospital's
main corridor with a table placed between them. 265 A correction
officer remained in close proximity. 264 During the months following
his diagnosis, Doe and his wife sought counseling and education
regarding safe sex practices and other precautions to avoid infec-
tion.265 Counselors advised the wife of the importance of providing
emotional support and maintaining the family bond during her
husband's illness. 266
In February, 1986, correction officials denied Doe's application
for further conjugal visits. 267 Officials purportedly based this denial
on regulations issued by the Department of Correctional Services. 268
These regulations stated that prisoners who have diagnosed com-
municable diseases may be disqualified from participating in the
family visitation program. 269 Prison officials denied Doe's applica-
tion to visit privately with other family members for the same rea-
son. 27° Doe challenged the correction officials' decision to terminate
him from further conjugal visits, arguing that the denial violated
his constitutional rights to marital privacy, due process, and equal
protection of the laws. 2" The lower court held that prison officials
had the right to deny Doe participation in conjugal visits. 272 Affirm-
260 Id. at 60, 518 N.E.2d at 544, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
261 Id. at 50, 518 N.E.2d at 538, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 784.
262/d .
263 Id. at 70, 518 N.E.2d at 550, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 796 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
264 Id.
263 Id.
266 1d. at 70, 518 N.E.2d at 550-51, 23 N.Y.S.2d at 796.
267 Id. at 50, 518 N.E.2d at 538, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 784.
268 Id. at 51, 518 N.E.2d at 538, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 784 (citing N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
RECS. tit. 7, § 220.3(c)(8) (1983), which states that a prisoner "who has a diagnosed com-
municable disease may be disqualified from participating in the program unless found eligible
after special review").
263 Id,
270 Id. at 70, 518 N.E.2d at 551, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 797 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
271 Id. at 52, 518 N.E.2d at 539, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 785.
272 Id. at 60, 518 N.E.2d at 544, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 790. The New York Supreme Court
dismissed the prisoner's claim. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court affirmed.
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ing the ruling of the lower court, the New York Court of Appeals
upheld the prison's refusal to allow John Doe to participate in the
Family Reunion Program. 273 The Doe court held that no constitu-
tional right to . conjugal visits exists and that denying Doe's partici-
pation in the program violated neither his due process rights nor
his equal protection rights.
First, the Court of Appeals recognized that a general right to
privacy exists and cited several Supreme Court cases affirming such
right. 274
 The court then noted that prisoners do not forfeit all
constitutional rights upon incarceration, including the right to pri-
vacy. 275 At the same time, however, the appeals court stated that the
realities of confinement and legitimate penological goals limit such
rights. 27° The court added that intimate marital relations have tra-
ditionally been inconsistent with penological goals such as punish-
ment, security, deterrence and rehabilitation. 277 To this end, the
court held that no constitutional right to conjugal visits exists and,
further, that the state has no obligation to establish family reunion
programs. 278 The court cited Turner u. Salley, which enumerated
several elements of marriage that survive incarceration but did not
specifically include conjugal visits. 279 Further, the court held that
neither a prisoner nor his spouse has a right to marital privacy while
the prisoner is incarcerated, and, therefore, prison officials did not
violate any constitutional right to privacy by denying John Doe
further conjugal visits. 28°
Next, the Doe court held that prison officials did not violate any
due process rights in denying John Doe participation in the family
reunion program. 2" The court refuted the prisoner's claim that the
prison gave him a legitimate expectation that it would provide him
conjugal visits and that such expectation gave rise to protection
under the due process clause. 282 The Doe court reasoned that only
a legitimate expectation of a benefit, as compared to merely a pos-




	 at 52, 518 N.E.2d at 539, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 785.
275 Id. at 53, 518 N.E.2d at 539, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 785.
276 Id.






" Id. at 56, 518 N.E.2d at 541, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
July 19901
	
PRISONERS WITH AIDS	 999
To distinguish legitimate expectation from mere possibility, the
Doe court looked to whether access to the program arose from
objective or subjective criteria. 281 Where access derives from subjec-
tive criteria, no legitimate expectation is involved and, thus, access
does not implicate a constitutional right. 285 In the case of the Family
Reunion Program at Auburn Correctional Center, the criteria con-
sisted of fifteen guidelines, many of which the Doe court character-
ized as subjective. 286 Further, the court noted that prison regulations
require prisoners to reapply each time for participation in the pro-
gram, and officials review each new application. 287 The court con-
cluded that the program does not create a liberty interest because
prisoners do not have a legitimate expectation of participation in a
discretionary program. 288
Finally, the Doe court held that prison officials did not violate
John Doe's right to equal protection of the laws. 289 The court rec-
ognized that the right to equal protection of the laws survives in-
carceration. 29° The court noted, however, that minimum scrutiny
constitutes the appropriate standard of review of equal protection
claims in the absence of a classification affecting fundamental rights
or creating suspect classifications. 21 ' In Doe, the court held that
conjugal visits are not a fundamental right and that a classification
based on a communicable disease is not suspect. 292 Thus, equal
protection analysis merely required prison officials to show a ra-
tional relationship between the prison classification and some legit-
imate, articulated state purpose. 293
The Doe court stated that preventing the transmission and
spread of communicable diseases was a legitimate state purpose. 294
2" Id. at 55, 518 N.E.2d at 540, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
2" Id. at 55, 518 N.E.2d at 541, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
2" Id. The 15 guidelines are as follows: (I) length of incarceration; (2) degree of insti-
tutional adjustment; (3) eligibility for temporary release; (4) security classification; (5) assign-
ment to a special housing unit; (6) pattern of disruptive behavior; (7) prior violations of
Family Reunion Program regulations; (8) designation as a central monitoring case; (9) out-
standing warrants; (10) nature of conviction; (11) parole violation status; (12) protective
custody status; (I3) participation in some other special program; (14) assignment to mental
hygiene unit; and (15) diagnosis as having a communicable disease. Id. at 55 n.1, 518 N.E.2d
at 541 n.l, 523 N.Y,S.2d at 787 n.l.
2" Id. at 56, 518 N.E.2d at 541, 523 N.Y,S.2d at 787.
see Id,
2" Id. at 60, 518 N.E.2d at 544, 523 N.Y,S.2d at 790.
290 1d. at 56, 518 N,E.2d at 541, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
291 1d. at 56, 518 N.E.2d at 541-42, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 788.
292 /d. at 57, 518 N.E.2d at 542, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 788.
2" Id.
"4 Id.
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The court noted that legitimate penological objectives are not re-
stricted necessarily to the internal prison environment but may
include the general safety of society. 295 The court cited- section
70(2)(a) of the New York Correction Law, which directed prison
officials to consider the safety and security of the community in
maintaining prisons and establishing rehabilitation programs. 296
The court concluded that preventing the spread of communicable
diseases to those outside the prison fell within this statute, and that
this penological goal was legitimate. 297 To this end, the court held
that prison officials had a rational basis for denying John Doe's
application to the family visitation program because reducing the
risk of transmitting the AIDS virus to others, such as his wife, is a
legitimate state purpose. 298 Accordingly, the court denied Doe's
equal protection claim under the minimum standard of review.299
The court did not, however, employ the four-part test of Turner v.
Safley for reviewing prisoners' claims under this standard of re-
view. 3°° In Turner, the Court had applied a reasonableness standard
in which the regulation had to be reasonably related to a legitimate
state purpose."' Instead, the Doe court deferred to the judgment
and expertise of the correctional system in employing minimum
scrutiny, requiring only that a rational relationship exist between
the regulation and legitimate penological goal 002
In addition to his constitutional challenges, the Doe court also
denied John Doe's claim that prison officials discriminated against
him as a handicapped person under section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act."' The court implicitly recognized that AIDS may consti-
tute a handicap under section 504. 3" The court noted, however,
that, even if AIDS constitutes a handicap under section 504, John
Doe was not otherwise qualified to participate in the program be-
cause he had a communicable disease, and prisoners with commun-
icable diseases were excluded from the program. 305
295 Id. at 59, 518 N.E.2d at 543, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 789.
296 Id.
297 Doe v. Coughlin, 71 N.Y.2d 48, 59, 518 N.E.2d 536, 543, 523 N.Y.S.2d 782, 789
• (1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 196 (1988).
299 Id. at 60, 518 N.E.2d at 544, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
299 Id.
9°' See supra note 133 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Turner test.
'01 See Turner v. Salley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-96 (1987).
"Doe, 71 N.Y.2d at 59-60, 518 N.E.2d at 543-44, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 789-90,
5°5 Id. at 61, 518 N.E.2d at 544, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
"4 Id.
393 Id.
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In summary, the Doe court held that prisoners have no consti-
tutional right to conjugal visits, and that prison officials did not
violate any marital privacy right of John Doe or his wife. Further,
the court held that Doe had no legitimate expectation of partici-
pation in conjugal visits that created a liberty interest and, therefore,
prison officials did not violate any clue process rights of John Doe.
The court also held that prison officials did not violate Doe's right
to equal protection of the laws because the classification for conta-
gious diseases was rationally related to a legitimate state purpose of
reducing the risk of transmission of the AIDS virus. Lastly, the
court held that prison officials did not violate section 504 because
the prisoner, even if handicapped within the meaning of the Re-
habilitation Act, was not otherwise qualified to participate in con-
jugal visits.
Concurring opinions of both Chief Judge Wachtler and Judge
Bellacosa noted that the prison regulation warranted a higher level
of review than minimum scrutiny. 306 Both judges acknowledged that
conjugal visits implicate fundamental constitutional protections. 307
Chief Judge Wachtler reasoned that the prison officials' decision to
deny conjugal visits to an AIDS-infected prisoner encroached upon
intimate aspects of the marital relationship, and, therefore, the
decision raised constitutional implications that should not be con-
trolled by a mere rational basis test. 308
Although Chief Judge Wachtler stated that higher scrutiny was
appropriate, he concluded that the prison regulation still met the
higher standard of review under Turner v. Safley."9 In applying the
four-part Turner test, Chief Judge Wachtler first stated that the
prison regulation was reasonably related to a legitimate penological
objective—the safety and security of the community. 3 " He noted
that a legitimate penological objective includes protecting a prison
visitor from the risk of exposure to AIDS. 3 " Chief Judge Wachtler
then stated that alternative means of exercising conjugal visits did
not exist and that prison officials could not provide easy alternatives
to accommodate the interests of the AIDS-infected prisoner. 312 He
"Id, at 61, 518 N.E.2d at 544, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 790 (Bellacosa, J., concurring); id. at
62, 518 N.E.2d at 545, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 791 (Wachtler, C.J., concurring).
307 Id.
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concluded that the prison regulation was not an exaggerated re-
sponse to the perceived risk of transmission of the AIDS virus. 3 "
At the same time, however, Chief Judge Wachtler noted that
prison officials need to consider alternatives to complete inaccess to
family visitation programs. 3 ' 4
 He stated that the emotional support
and commitment of marriage might be the only remaining comfort
for an AIDS-infected prisoner, and, therefore, prison officials
should consider alternatives to denial of conjugal visits. 3 "
In his dissenting opinion in Doe, Judge Alexander disagreed
with the majority opinion's minimum standard of review." 6 In con-
trast to the majority opinion, Judge Alexander argued both that
conjugal visits implicate marital privacy rights and that no legitimate
penological purpose existed for prison officials' denial.of such visits
to John Doe and his wife. 317
 Like the concurring judges, Judge
Alexander advocated a higher standard of judicial review than the
mere rational basis applied by the majority.'"
Judge Alexander asserted that the regulation preventing John
Doe from participating in the family visitation program violated the.
fundamental right of marital privacy. 3 " Judge Alexander noted that
a married couple's decision to risk the consequences of sexual' in-
tercourse was constitutionally protected as part of the intimate de-
cision-making affirmed by Griswold v. Connecticut and its progeny. 32°
Although Judge Alexander acknowledged that constitutional rights.
are necessarily limited or withdrawn by incarceration, he also noted
that prisoners do not forfeit all such rights. 32 ' According to Judge
Alexander, such rights are guaranteed unless outweighed. by com-
peting penological interests. 322 Judge Alexander cited Turner v. Sa-
lley in noting that such rights include the marital relationship, which






 Id. at 63, 518 N.E.2d at 546, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 792 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
' 17 Id.
318 1d. at 68, 518 N.E.2d at 549, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 795 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
' 19 Id. at 63, 67, 518 N.E.2d at 546, 549, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 792, 795 (Alexander, 1,
dissenting).
520 1d.
321 Id. at 65, 518 N.E.2d at 547, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 793 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
'22 /d. at 64-65, 518 N.E.2d at 548, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 794 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
323 Id. at 65, 518 N.E.2d at 547, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 793 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
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Although Judge Alexander agreed with the majority that no
actual constitutional right to conjugal visits exists, he noted that
once the state implements such visits, prison .officials do not have
unfettered discretion to condition eligibility.'" Having made such
visits available, decisions involving sexual relations implicate the
fundamental marital privacy right. 325
 According to Judge Alexan-
der, such marital privacy rights survive incarceration and, therefore,
the prison could not infringe upon that right by precluding John
Doe and his wife from making personal intimate decisions regard-
ing sex. 328
 Judge Alexander noted that the court must balance the
competing interests of the prisoner's fundamental right in marital
privacy against the penological needs justifying the denial of con-
jugal visits."' He concluded that prison officials did not have any
legitimate penological purpose for this denial of conjugal visits be-
cause it was not based on any concern for institutional security or
any other legitimate penological objectives. 328
Judge Alexander asserted that the purported penological goal
of reducing the transmission of the AIDS virus was not legitimate
because it was directed not at prisoners but at their family members,
and, therefore, bore no relationship to traditional penological in-
terests of security, deterrence or rehabilitation.'" Judge Alexander
noted that the Department of Correctional Services did not have
the authority to regulate matters pertaining to public health."° He
stated that section 70(2)(a) of the New York Correction Law, cited
by the majority, defined safety and security of the community in
terms of protecting the community from dangerous criminals, not
from contagious diseases. 3" In effect, Judge Alexander asserted
524 Id. at 67, 518 N.E.2d at 548, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 794 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
525 Id.
528 Id. at 67, 518 N.E.2d at 549, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 795 (Alexander, J., dissenting). Judge
Alexander also validated John Doe's equal protection claim on the basis that prison officials
discriminated against him by treating him differently from like-situated prisoners at the
prison in a way that burdened the exercise of the marital privacy right. Id.
"5
 Id. at 68-69, 518 N.E.2d at 549-50, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 796 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
'24 Id. at 71, 518 N.E.2d at 551, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 797 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
"9 Id.
3" Id. at 73, 518 N.E.2d at 553, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 799 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
"' Id. In his concurring opinion, Chief Judge Wachtler stated that the penological goals
included protecting a visitor to the prison from the risks of contracting AIDS, Id. at 61-62,
518 N.E.2d at 545, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 791 (Wachtler, C.J., concurring). In his dissent, Judge
Alexander stated that the purpose of the statute was to "enable [prison administrators] to
structure programs that reintegrate the inmate with society and reduce recidivism." Id. at
73, 518 N.E.2d at 553, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 799 (Alexander, J., dissenting). He asserted that
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that the Doe majority mistakenly construed the prevention of trans-
mission of the AIDS virus to be a legitimate penological goal.
Unlike the majority, Judge Alexander employed the four-part
reasonableness standard delineated in Turner v. Safley to assess the
competing interests of prisons and prisoners.'" In so doing, he
found no valid logical connection between the prison regulation
and the purported penological interest put forward to justify it;
that the penological interest was not legitimate; and that, even if
the connection was less tenuous, the denial of conjugal visits rep-
resented an exaggerated response to Doe's AIDS status because
obvious, easy alternatives to the prison regulation existed that could
accommodate Doe's interests while imposing de minimis burdens
on prison resources.'" He further asserted that the prison regula-
tions impinged upon the constitutional rights of non-prisoners,
denying Doe's wife her marital privacy right to decide whether to
risk engaging in sexual intercourse with her husband.'"
Judge Alexander concluded that the court should weigh com-
peting interests in favor of Doe, because prison officials had not
established any legitimate penological goal that outweighed the sig-
nificant interests of Doe and his wife in marital privacy."' Unlike
the majority, Judge Alexander favored a higher standard of review
in light of the significant fundamental interest in marital privacy at
stake. But even in applying the less stringent standard of review
from Turner v. Safley, Judge Alexander argued that the denial of
conjugal visits did not pass constitutional muster because the state
had no right to prevent John Doe and his wife from engaging in
conjugal visits. 396 He concluded that whether the court employed
higher or lower level judicial scrutiny, the prison regulation was
based on illegitimate penological interests, and was, therefore, an
impermissible infringement upon John Doe's constitutional
rights.ss'
safety and security pertain to the "protection of the community from dangerous criminals
who (prison officials] may consider releasing into the community as members of a rehabili-
tation program." Id.
"2 Id. at 68, 518 N.E.2d at 549, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 795 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
333
 Id. at 71-72, 518 N.E.2d at 551-52, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 797 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
"4
 Id. at 72-73, 518 N.E.2d at 552, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 798 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
Judge Alexander noted that prison officials' denial of Doe's visits with other family members
further highlighted the exaggerated response of those officials to Doe's having AIDS because
family members are in no danger of contracting the HIV virus in such casual visits. Id. at
72, 518 N.E.2d at 552, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 798 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
333 Id. at 74-75, 518 N.E.2d at 554, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 799 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
"6 Id. at 68, 518 N.E.2d at 549, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 795 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
197 Id. at 74, 518 N.E.2d at 553, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 799 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
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The Doe court concluded that conjugal visits are a privilege,
not a constitutional right, and, therefore, AIDS-infected prisoners
are not deprived of any constitutional right when prison officials
deny them conjugal visits. Further, the court held that prisoners
with AIDS do not have valid section 504 claims because they are
not otherwise qualified for conjugal visits, and state prisons are not
federal recipients. Although the concurring judges agreed with the
majority's conclusion that prison officials did not infringe upon the
constitutional rights of AIDS-infected prisoners by denying them
conjugal visits, both Chief Judge Wachtler and Judge Bellacosa
advocated a higher standard of review than mere minimum scru-
tiny. In dissent, Judge Alexander not only advocated for higher
scrutiny but concluded that prison officials' denial of conjugal visits
violated the AIDS-infected prisoner's fundamental right of marital
privacy.
IV. ANALYSIS OF AIDS-INFECTED PRISONERS' CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY RIGHTS IMPLICATED IN FAMILY VISITATION PROGRAMS
A. The Fundamental Right to Marital Privacy Implicated in Conjugal
Visits
The United States Supreme Court has held that prisoners re-
tain some fundamental rights despite their incarceration.'" Al-
though the Supreme Court has recognized a fundamental right of
privacy for free citizens,'" courts have differed in the degree to
which they have accorded the right of privacy to prisoners."" Courts
have grounded the right to marital privacy for free citizens in the
recognition of a married couple's right to make intimate personal
decisions pertaining to their marriage."' Even in the prison setting,
where constitutional rights are limited, the Supreme Court has
recognized that the right to marital privacy still exists. 342
"8 Sec supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text for an identification of the range of
constitutional rights to which prisoners are entitled.
5" Sec supra note 58 and accompanying text fur a discussion of the fundamental right
of privacy.
"° See supra notes 68-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of how courts have
ruled on fundamental privacy rights of prisoners.
"I See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of the marital right of
privacy.
342 See supra notes 68-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the marital privacy
right of prisoners.
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In Turner v. Safley, the Supreme Court held that even though
prison officials impose substantial restrictions on the right of pris-
oners to marry, prisoners still maintain certain rights that touch
issues of marital privacy. 343 The Turner Court identified certain
aspects of marriage that are unaffected by incarceration or the
pursuit of legitimate penological interests, including expressions of
emotional support and public commitment.'" The Turner Court
noted that the decision to marry is a completely private one and,
moreover, elements of marriage that remain despite incarceration
are sufficient to form a constitutionally protected marital relation-
ship in the prison context. 345
Courts have held that prisoners are not constitutionally entitled
to conjugal visits. 346 Once state prisons establish family visitation
programs, however, the state has created a program affording the
opportunity for prisoners to exercise a fundamental right. 347 When
that opportunity is denied solely to prohibit sex between the mar-
ried couple in order to prevent the transmission of the AIDS virus,
the state has implicated the marital privacy right. 348
Judge Alexander was correct in his Doe dissent in stating that
prison officials' denial of conjugal visits for an AIDS-infected pris-
oner implicates the fundamental right to marital privacy. Even
Judge Bellacosa and Chief Judge Wachtler, in their concurring
opinions, noted that conjugal visits implicate fundamental consti-
tutional rights worthy of protection. 349 Judges Alexander, Bellacosa
and Wachtler all correctly stated that the Doe court should apply
heightened, not minimum, scrutiny because the prison regulation
prohibiting an AIDS-infected prisoner from participating in con-
jugal visits implicated the fundamental right to marital privacy.350
The state's prohibition of AIDS-infected prisoners from con-
jugal visits also implicates the marital privacy rights of free citizens.
s49 See supra notes 131-136 for a more complete discussion of Turner v. Safley.
544 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-96 (1987).
345 Id,
546 See supra notes 243-254 and accompanying text for a discussion of the constitution-
ality of conjugal visits.
S17 See Doe v. Coughlin, 71 N.Y.2d 48, 67, 518 N.E.2d 536, 548-49, 523 N.Y.S.2d 782,
794-95 (Alexander, J., dissenting),
349 Id. at 67, 518 N.E.2d at 549, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 795 (Alexander, J., dissenting). Further,
when prison officials deny prisoners family visits with their children or extended family
members, the deprivation implicates the privacy rights of prisoners even more seriously.
549 See id. at 61, 518 N.E.2d at 544, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 790 (Bellacosa, J., concurring); id.
at 62, 518 N.E.2d at 545, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 791 (Wachtler, C.J., concurring).
"° See id. at 61, 518 N.E.2d at 544, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 790 (Bellacosa, J., concurring); id.
at 62, 518 N.E.2d at 545, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 791 (Wachtler, C.J., concurring); id. at 63, 518
N.E.2d at 546, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 792 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
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In Procunier v. Martinez, the Supreme Court recognized the consti-
tutional rights of free citizens when prison regulations worked a
consequential restriction on the rights of those citizens."' In Mar-
tinez, the Court applied heightened scrutiny to mail censorship reg-
ulations because such censorship restricted the first and fourteenth
amendment rights of those who were not prisoners. 352 Although
the Supreme Court recently overruled Martinez in part in the 1989
case of Thornburgh v. Abbott, the Abbott Court noted that prisons
cannot prevent free citizens from exercising their own constitutional
rights in making contact with prisoners. 353
In Abbott, the Supreme Court noted that prison officials must
strike a balance between institutional order and security, and
the legitimate demands of outsiders."' In cases where the courts
have limited the rights of 'outsiders, however, the penological
interests have involved institutional operations, not public
health. 355 When the state denies family members conjugal visits
with prisoners, the purported penological interests become em-
bedded in such public health concerns, not legitimate penological
objectives.
Thus, the majority in Doe v. Coughlin was incorrect in conclud-
ing that denial of conjugal visits does not implicate the fundamental
right of marital privacy. Further, certain marital privacy rights of
both prisoners and their family members survive even incarceration.
Although the Court in Turner v. Salley struck down a prison mar-
riage regulation because the purported penological objectives of
security and order had no reasonable relationship to the regulation,
the Court stated in dicta that the implication of family members'
interests may support application of the higher standard of review
employed in Martinez. 356
 Heightened scrutiny is appropriate in re-
viewing the constitutionality of denying prisoners family visits be-
cause such visits implicate the fundamental rights of privacy of not
only prisoners but of free citizens as wel1. 357
551
 Procunier v. Martinet, 416 U.S. 396, 409 (1974). See also supra notes 87-100 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the constitutional rights of non-prisoners implicated
in prison regulations.
"2 Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413.
"' See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. 1874, 1878 (1989).
354 Id.
s" See, e•g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817,
822-23 (1974).
156 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 97 (1987).
a5'
	 supra note 64 and accompanying text for a discussion of heightened scrutiny
applied by the courts to the constitutional rights of non-prisoners.
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B. Strict Scrutiny as the Appropriate Standard of Review for Conjugal
Visits
Judge Alexander was correct in his dissenting- opinion in Doe
when he noted that conjugal visits implicate the fundamental right
of marital privacy and, therefore, that their denial to prisoners must
be reviewed under strict scrutiny. 358 The Doe court should have
employed strict scrutiny as the standard of review for conjugal visit
regulations. Strict scrutiny requires a compelling state interest to
justify infringement of a fundamental right. 359 Such scrutiny is
appropriate where prison regulations regarding conjugal visits im-
plicate the fundamental right to marital privacy.
If a compelling state interest does exist in the context of prison
regulations, it must be related to the penological objectives of the
prison administration.360 In Doe, the purported state interest was
the reduction of the incidence of AIDS. 56 ' Reducing the risk of a
communicable disease within the prison itself may be a compelling
state interest when directed at prisoners because such reduction
clearly relates to penological interests in prison safety and security.
Reducing the risk of a communicable disease in the outside com-
munity directed at non-prisoners, however, is not a compelling state
interest. 362
In Doe, the regulation prohibiting an inmate from participating
in further conjugal visits purportedly focused on concerns for com-
munity, not institutional, safety and security. As Judge Alexander
pointed out in his discussion of section 70(2)(a) of the New York
Correction Law, prison regulations should address matters of insti-
tutional security, not public health, particularly when statutory ref-
erences to community safety and security have focused on the es-
cape or presence of dangerous criminals, not the containment of
sexually transmitted diseases. 363 The prohibition against AIDS-in-
338 See Doe v. Coughlin, 71 N.Y.2d 48, 68, 518 N.E.2d 536, 549, 523 N.Y.S.2d 782, 795
(1987) (Alexander, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 196 (1988).
380
	 supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of strict scrutiny.
'f'D See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974) (legitimate penological objectives
included deterrence of crime, insulation of offenders from society, rehabilitation, and internal
prison security); Salisbury v. List, 501 F. Supp. 105, 110 (1). Nev. 1980) (compelling state
interests included security, order and discipline).
36 ' Doe, 71 N.Y.2d at 71, 518 N.E.2d at 551, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 797 (Alexander, J., dis-
senting).
363 Id. Judge Alexander stated: "[Prison officials] have not shown how [their] policy bears
any relationship to the traditional purposes for incarceration, or how it addresses concerns
for institutional security and administration." Id.
363 Id, at 73, 518 N.E.2d at 553, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 799 (Alexander, J., dissenting) (citing
N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 70(2)(a) (McKinney 1987)). Judge Alexander added that the Depart-
ment of Correctional Services is not charged with the regulation of public health. Id.
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fected prisoners' participation in conjugal visits does not meet any
compelling state interest related to institutional security or safety.
The prohibition against the participation in conjugal visits by
inmates with AIDS does, however, contravene rehabilitation as a
legitimate penological objective. Prisons developed conjugal visits
because of their potential rehabilitative purpose in helping to main-
tain or restore family and marital relationships, to facilitate
smoother transitions from prison to civilian life, and to offer needed
emotional support."4 For prisoners with terminal illnesses such as
AIDS, the rehabilitative value of conjugal visits may be even more
significant."' The denial, and particularly the revocation, of partic-
ipation in conjugal visits for eligible prisoners withholds what may
be a particularly life-enhancing rehabilitation program for AIDS-
.infected prisoners.
Of all the various penological interests, rehabilitation, not se-
curity or order, remains most relevant to conjugal visits. Denial of
such visits undermines rehabilitation and it does not further any
other legitimate penological interest. In this context, rehabilitation
seems to be the only relevant penological interest at stake and
outweighs any purported interest in public health, particularly when
such interest is not even a legitimate penological concern.
The Doe court minimized rehabilitative concerns in its balancing
of penological interests against an AIDS-infected prisoner's right to
marital privacy."' Further, the state failed to demonstrate that any
legitimate, let alone compelling, state interest existed to justify an
AIDS-infected prisoner's exclusion from participation in conjugal
visits. 367 Where there is no compelling state interest to justify this
exclusion, then prison officials' actions must fail under strict scru-
tiny."'
C. The Failure of Doe v. Coughlin to Meet the Reasonableness
Standard under Turner v. Safley
Even in the absence of strict scrutiny, Doe v. Coughlin fails the
reasonableness standard of minimum scrutiny delineated in Turner
mw See supra notes 240-242 and accompanying text for a discussion of the rehabilitation
purposes of conjugal visits.
563 See Doe, 71 N.Y.2d at 61-62, 518 N.E.2d at 545, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 791 (Wachtler, C.J.,
concurring). Even Chief Judge Wachtler acknowledged the particular significance of the
"emotional support and commitment symbolized by marriage" for a prisoner with AIDS. Id.
368 Id. at 59, 518 N.E.2d at 543, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 789.
567 Id. at 73, 518 N.E.2d at 553, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 799 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
665 Id.
1010
	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 31:967
v. Safley and employed subsequently by the Supreme Court in re-
viewing prison regulations. 3° A prison regulation that reasonably
relates to legitimate penological objectives lies at the crux of the
Turner standard. 37° The Doe court incorrectly failed to apply the
four-part Turner test to determine whether the denial of conjugal
visits for an AIDS-infected prisoner was unconstitutional. If the
court had applied the Turner test, it would have found that prison
officials' denial of conjugal visits did not meet the reasonableness
standard under Turner.
The prison regulation in Doe failed to meet the first part of the
test, in which the connection between the regulation and a legitimate
and neutral penological interest must be rational."' In Doe, the
purported penological interest,in reducing the transmission of a
communicable disease in the community was not legitimate. Legit-
imacy should be based on proper authority and expertise. 372 Pen-
ological interests related to institutional security, order and disci-
pline are legitimate because they arise from the unique expertise
and authority of prison officials. In Doe, prison officials prohibited
an inmate from further conjugal visits purportedly to protect the
health of the inmate's family and, speculatively, the health of the
general community. 373 These officials did not base the prohibition
on traditional institutional interests of security, order or discipline.
In contrast, officials purportedly acted on the basis of public health
goals that were neither substantiated by evidence nor within the
realm of correctional expertise. 374
Further, the purported penological interest in public health
was not neutral. Prison officials prevented Doe from family visita-
tion not only with his wife but with other family members because
of the purported risk of transmission of the AIDS virus. Given that
family members were at no risk of contracting the virus through
casual contact with their AIDS-infected relative, 375 the prohibition
369 See supra note 137 and accompanying text for a discussion of Supreme Court cases
applying the Turner standard.
379 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). The four parts of the Turner test include:
(1) a valid rational connection between the prison regulation and a legitimate and neutral
penological interest; (2) alternative means of exercising the right; (3) the impact on the prison
environment; and (4) ready alternatives to address the advanced concerns. Id. at 89-91.
"' Doe, 71 N.Y.2d at 71, 518 N.E.2d at 551, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 797 (Alexander, J., dis-
senting).
"' Id. at 74, 518 N.E.2d at 553, 523 N.Y.S,2d at 799 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
573 Id. at 57-58, 518 N.E.2d at 542, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 788.
"4 Id. at 73, 518 N.E.2d at 553, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 799 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
"3 See generally M. GUNDERSON, D. MAYO & F. RUAME, supra note 4, at 24-29; T. HAM-
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of conjugal visits by prison officials was merely a pretext for dis-
criminating against John Doe. Thus, the prison regulation fails the
first part of the Turner test because the penological interest was
neither legitimate nor neutral.
Even if the state interest in reducing the risk of transmission
of AIDS constituted a legitimate and neutral penological objective,
no valid, logical connection existed between such interest and the
denial of conjugal visits to a prisoner with AIDS. In Doe, prison
officials' decision to deny an AIDS-infected prisoner conjugal visits
was grounded in what Judge Alexander found to be "presumptions"
and "speculations." s 76 The state presumed, for instance, that pris-
oners with AIDS and their spouses would not take appropriate
precautions if and when they engaged in sexual intercourse and,
further, that spouses were necessarily at high risk to contract the
AIDS virus. These presumptions and speculations reveal that the
Purported logical connection was tenuous at best.
The prison regulation in Doe may have met the second part of
the Turner test in that alternative means of exercising the right to
marital privacy may not have existed. The prison regulation, how-
ever, failed the third part of the Turner test. No adverse impact on
prison officials, other prisoners, or prison resources resulted from
accommodating the right of prisoners and their spouses to make
their private decisions regarding sexual intimacy.
First, prison staff was no more burdened in providing conjugal
visits to prisoners with AIDS than to other prisoners. Second, other
prisoners were unaffected by AIDS-infected prisoners' participation
in conjugal visits. Third, no additional prison resources needed to
be expended, other than providing counseling and education for
prisoners and their families. Prison officials should provide such
counseling and education for all prisoners, however, regardless of
their participation in conjugal visits, because all prisoners are po-
rom -r, supra note I, at 8; T. HAmmErr, supra note 3, at 6 for discussions that casual contact
presents no risk of transmission of the HIV virus.
"6 See Doe, 71 N.Y.2d at 71, 518 N.E.2d at 551, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 797 (Alexander, j.,
dissenting). In his dissent, Judge Alexander noted:
[Prison administrators:I determination, at bottom, is based on a series of spec-
ulations and unwarranted presumptions: that petitioners necessarily will disre-
gard the advice of their professional health care counselors and not employ
"safe sex" techniques. that petitioner wife necessarily will contract. AIDS from
her husband, and that petitioner wife necessarily will engage in adulterous
sexual activities with others—without the use of prophylactics—and thereby
transmit the virus to the population at large.
Id.
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tentially at risk to contract the AIDS virus. 377
 It is inappropriate to
combat AIDS by infringing upon the privacy rights of married
prisoners, a policy that will have little effect on the incidence of
AIDS. Rather, counseling and education of all prisoners is a more
rational response to the risk of the transmission of AIDS. In Doe,
given that the purported penological interests in question were
community, not institutionally, oriented, the availability of conjugal
visits for prisoners with AIDS did not impact the prison environ-
ment itself.
Lastly, ready alternatives existed to address the concerns of
prison officials regarding the risk of transmission of AIDS to non-
prisoners. 378
 Prisoners could choose to refrain from sex altogether,
or they could receive education about necessary precautions, in-
cluding hygiene and safe sex practices. 379
 When a married couple,
such as the Does, has received education and counseling, the exis-
tence of alternatives to ensure the reduced risk of transmission of
the AIDS virus shows that the regulation is an exaggerated response
to prison concerns. As a result, the prison regulation failed the last
part of the Turner test because ready alternatives to address the
concerns of prison officials were available.
Prison officials' decision to prohibit participation in conjugal
visits, and subsequent judicial support for such a decision, reflects
an exaggerated response to the problem of prisoners with AIDS.
In fact, a court's facial validation for such prohibition suggests a
prejudicial reaction to AIDS. Such paternalism, particularly over
free citizens capable of making informed decisions about their
health and intimate relations with AIDS-infected family members,
is not assumed legitimately by prison officials. As Judge Alexander
stated in his dissent in Doe, prison officials acted outside their scope
of expertise and knowledge in denying conjugal visits on the basis
of public health goals. 38° Although prisoners may not be constitu-
tionally entitled to conjugal visits, if the state establishes such visits,
'" See supra note 10 for a description of the incidence of HIV infection in the prison
population.
s'
	 71 N.Y.2d at 71, 518 N.E.2d at 552, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 797 (Alexander, J., dis-
senting).
3" Condoms have been demonstrated to be effective preventive devices; moreover, the
AIDS virus is quite fragile and transmission can be easily avoided. See Rinzler, The Return of
the Condarn, AM. HEALTH, July 1987, at 97; see also SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 2,
at 17.
38° Doe, 71 N.Y.2d at 73-74, 518 N.E.2d at 553, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 799 (Alexander, J.,
dissenting).
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they must be• administered constitutionally, because they directly
implicate the fundamental right to marital privacy."'
Prison regulations precluding AIDS-infected inmates from par-
ticipation in conjugal visits fail to satisfy strict scrutiny because
prison officials cannot provide any compelling state interest for such
regulations. Further, these regulations even fail the lesser standard
of review of the four-part Turner test. The Doe court wrongly ap-
plied minimum scrutiny to the prison regulations and, moreover,
did not comply with the Turner test.
D. Denial of Conjugal Visits to AIDS-Infected Inmates: Denial of Equal
Protection
In addition to violating the substantive due process right to
marital privacy, prison officials' denial of conjugal visits also violates
equal protection of the laws. Although the United States Supreme
Court has applied strict scrutiny to racial classifications in prisons, 38"
the Court has applied almost uniformly a lesser standard of review
to non-racial classifications.'" If courts did employ strict scrutiny in
reviewing prison classifications, however, and compelling state in-
terests were found, such classifications must be narrowly tailored to
those compelling interests. 384
The classification of prisoners with contagious diseases in Doe
v. Coughlin would necessarily fail strict scrutiny because such clas-
sification was both under and overinclusive, and it was not narrowly
tailored to state interests.'" In Doe, the regulation was underinclu-
sive because it did not necessarily include all prisoners who might
be HIV-positive'm and, thus, at risk to expose spouses to the AIDS
mu See id. at 67,518 N.E.2d 548-49,523 N.Y.S.2d at 794-95 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
3" See Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333,333 (1968).
'83 See supra notes 103-105 and accompanying text for a discussion of the minimum
scrutiny standard of judicial review for prisoner classifications.
3" See supra notes 106-112 and accompanying text for a discussion of strict scrutiny.
333 See L. TRIBE, supra note 114, § 16-4, at 1446-50 for a discussion of over and
underinclusive classifications.
'" At the same time, someone may be infected with the HIV virus without yet having
developed any antibodies. T. HammErr, supra note 1, at 4. Antibodies, which arise in the
blood, are evidence of infection, and develop as part of the immune system's attempt to fight
off the infection. Id. at 3. In the absence of antibodies, the HIV test result may be negative,
depending upon the type of HIV test taken by the individual. Id. at 4. According to Hammett:
A principal advantage of an antigen test is that it will be positive immediately
upon infection, whereas the antibody tests will be falsely negative during the
period between infection and appearance of antibodies. This period is generally
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virus. As a result, the regulation unwittingly placed spouses at risk
for exposure to the virus. A spouse might have been placed at even
greater risk by engaging in unprotected sex because of the married
couple's ignorance of the prisoner's HIV-positive status. Such ig-
norance places spouses of prisoners at potentially greater risk than
those spouses of prisoners diagnosed with AIDS who have informed
their spouses of their medical status.
The classification in Doe was also overinclusive in that its inclu-
sion of all prisoners with AIDS imposed a burden upon prisoners
who may not have placed their spouses at the risk that the regulation
sought to prevent. Such a classification would include prisoners who
place their spouses at no risk for potential transmission of the AIDS
virus. The state, however, presumed all prisoners would place their
spouses at risk and, accordingly, the state set up an overinclusive
classification."' Such a classification was based upon speculation and
unwarranted presumptions. 388
 In effect, this classification was an
overgeneralization that lacked a narrow fit between the classification
and any compelling state interest. 389
 On this basis, the regulation in
Doe v. Coughlin violated equal protection under the fourteenth
amendment.
Courts, however, have generally subjected prisoners' equal pro-
tection claims to minimum, not strict, scrutiny. 390 Prison adminis-
trators may not, however, regulate programs in a constitutionally
impermissible manner. 39 ' If prison administrators deny a prisoner
a privilege enjoyed by similarly situated inmates, this denial raises
an equal protection claim. 392
 Where unequal treatment exists, the
state must demonstrate a rational relationship between such treat-
ment and a legitimate state purpose. The purported penological
purpose in denying a prisoner with AIDS conjugal visits, however,
thought to be between three and twelve weeks, although some recent data
indicate that the lagtime may sometimes be significantly longer.
Id. Thus, the prison regulation would not necessarily be underinclusive where an HIV test
cannot yet detect the presence of antibodies.
552
 Doe v. Coughlin, 71 N.Y.2d 48, 71, 518 N.E.2d 536, 551, 523 N.Y.S.2d 782, 797
(1987) (Alexander, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 196 (1988).
559 See supra note 376 for a description of these unwarranted presumptions and specu-
lations.
599 See L. TRIBE, supra note 114, § 16-4, at 1449-50 for a brief discussion of overinclusive
classifications. 	 •
590 See supra notes 113-129 and accompanying text for a discussion of the minimum
scrutiny standaid of judicial review of prisoners' equal protection claims.
591
 See Appellants' Brief at 8, Doe v. Coughlin, 71 N.Y.2d 48, 518 N.E.2d 536, 523
N.Y.S.2d 782 (1987) (No. 5402), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 196 (1988).
592 See Appellants' Brief at 7.
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is illegitimate because the public health does not fall within the
appropriate purview of prison officials. Therefore, the state still
violates a prisoner's equal protection claim under the less stringent
standard of minimum scrutiny in the absence of a legitimate state
interest.
Thus, prison officials in Doe failed to meet the constitutional
standards under both equal protection and substantive due process.
In both cases, prison officials failed to demonstrate even under
minimum scrutiny a rational relationship between denial of conjugal
visits and any legitimate state purpose. The minimum standard of
review applied to both the equal protection and substantive due
process claims of the AIDS-infected prisoner results in the same
conclusion that the Doe court wrongly decided these constitutional
claims.
E. Application of the Rehabilitation Act to Conjugal Visits for AIDS-
Infected Prisoners
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act precludes discrimination
against individuals with handicaps. 393
 Congress amended the Re-
habilitation Act to include contagious diseases as a handicap entitled
to protection under section 504. 394 Similarly, courts have held that
a person with AIDS is handicapped within the meaning of the
Rehabilitation Act. 395
 Thus, a prisoner with AIDS is a handicapped
individual under the Rehabilitation Act.
Once the court has established that an individual is handi-
capped under the Rehabilitation Act, the court must find that the
handicapped individual is otherwise qualified for the program in
question.396
 The United States Supreme Court has held that if
applicants meet all the requirements of a program in spite of the
handicap, they are otherwise qualified."' Courts employ an indivi-
dualized inquiry in each case to determine whether an individual is
otherwise qualified. To do so, courts evaluate the nature of the risk;
393 29 U.S.C. II 706(8)(C), 794 (1988). See also supra notes 177-179 and accompanying
text for a discussion of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
394 See supra note 183 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Civil Rights Res-
toration Act, Pub, L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 706(8)(C),
794(6) (1988)).
393 See supra notes 179, 184-230 and accompanying text for a discussion of AIDS as a
handicap within the meaning of the Act.
39" See supra notes 188-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of "otherwise quali-
fied" under the Act.
397 See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979).
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the duration of the risk; the severity of the risk; and the probability
of transmission and resultant harm. 398
This individualized inquiry regarding AIDS-infected prisoners'
participation in conjugal visits reveals that such prisoners are oth-
erwise qualified. First, the nature of the risk would be the trans-
mission of the AIDS virus to the spouse of the prisoner through
unprotected sexual activity. Assuming, however, that the married
couple received education and counseling regarding safe sex prac-
tices, and took appropriate precautions, the nature of the risk is
significantly reduced, if not completely eliminated. 399
 Unlike other
contagious diseases, such as tuberculosis, transmission of the AIDS
virus can be controlled because it is neither airborne nor otherwise
easily transmitted. 4°° Second, however, the duration of the risk is
permanent, given that researchers have found no cure for AIDS to
date.4°'
Next, courts have established strict guidelines regarding the
severity of risk and the probability of transmission. 402
 The Supreme
Court in School Board v. Arline held that a person with a contagious
disease may not be otherwise qualified if a significant risk of trans-
mission exists. 403
 Other courts have applied this significant risk stan-
dard. 4°4
 Courts have required that infected persons place others at
a definite, not theoretical, risk for transmission of a contagious
disease. 405
 One court stated that routine precautions can signifi-
cantly reduce any theoretical risk. 406
Analogously, AIDS-infected prisoners must place their spouses
at a definite, not theoretical, risk for transmission of the AIDS virus
"8 See School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 274 (1987).
999
 Moreover, although heterosexual sex has been demonstrated to transmit the AIDS
virus, it may be an inefficient mode of transmission. See T. HAstmErr, supra note 3, at 5;
Appellants' Brief at 37-38, Doe v. Coughlin, 71 N.Y.2d 48, 518 N.E.2d 536, 523 N.Y.S.2d
782 (1987) (No. 5402), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 196 (1988).
400 See Thomas v, Atascadero Unified School Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376, 380 (C.D. Cal.
1987).
* 01 See M. GUNDERSON, D. MAYO & F. RHAME, supra note 4, at 36.
' 02 See Arline, 480 U.S. at 288.
'IDS See id. at 330.
' 1" See Thomas, 662 F. Supp. at 382 (finding no evidence that AIDS-infected child posed
significant risk of transmission to other children or teachers); New York State Ass'n for
Retarded Children v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644, 650 (2d Cir. 1979) (noting lack of evidence that
children who were carriers of hepatitis B actually engaged in high-risk activity for transmis-
sion of hepatitis).
405 See Thomas, 662 F. Supp. at 380; District 27 Community School Bd. v. Board of Educ.,
130 Misc. 2d 398, 413, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325, 335, 337 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
4°6 See District 27 Community School Bd., 130 Misc. 2d at 413, 415, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 335,
337.
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in light of the strict guidelines established by the courts. Similar to
other individuals with contagious diseases, prisoners with AIDS can
take routine precautions, just as the prisoner and his spouse did in
Doe v. Coughlin. 407 Specifically, AIDS-infected prisoners can receive
counseling and education, notify family members of their diagnosis
of AIDS and, if they engage in sex, ensure that it is protected sex.
Other states should follow the state of Connecticut, which allows its
prisoners with AIDS to participate in conjugal visits, provided that
the prisoner and his family are first interviewed personally by the
medical director and informed of the risk of transmission of the
HIV virus. 409
The Supreme Court held in Southeastern Community College v.
Davis that a handicapped individual is not otherwise qualified if the
program cannot reasonably accommodate the handicap.409 If the
program must incur undue burden or alter its fundamental nature
and purpose to accommodate the handicap, such accommodation
is unreasonable. As a result, the handicapped person is not other-
wise qualified.410 Thus, if reasonable accommodation will not elim-
inate a significant risk of transmission, the handicapped person will
not be otherwise qualified:411
With respect to conjugal visits, the accommodation by prison
officials in ensuring that AIDS-infected prisoners and their spouses
first engage in counseling and education neither imposes an undue
burden upon the prison nor alters the fundamental nature or pur-
pose of the family visitation program. Rather, the significance of
family . ties may be even greater for a terminally ill prisoner, thereby
further enhancing the purpose of the program. This reasonable
accommodation by prison officials can reduce the theoretical risk
of transmission of the AIDS virus in conjugal visits. Courts demand
an individualized inquiry, in part, to ensure that programs attempt
reasonable accommodation where the risk of transmission is signif-
icant so that exclusion from such programs is not based on un-
founded fear, prejudice, or stereotypes. 412 If the Doe court had
engaged in the individualized inquiry required under Artine,4 " the
4°1 71 N.Y.2d 48, 69, 518 N.E.2d 536, 550, 523 N.Y.S.2d 782, 796 (1987), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 196 (1988).
498
	
supra note 239 for a description of Connecticut's conjugal visitation program for
AIDS-infected . prisoners.
"9 442 U.S. 397, 412-13 (1979).
410 1d. at 410-12.
'" See School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.16 (1987).
114 see id.
41 ' See id. at 288.
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court would have found that the AIDS-infected prisoner was oth-
erwise qualified to participate in conjugal visits.
The third element of a section 504 claim, exclusion based solely
on the handicap, is met easily in Doe. Prison officials admitted that
the sole reason for denying John Doe's participation in conjugal
visits was his AIDS status. Accordingly, John Doe satisfied the third
element of his handicapped claim because he was excluded solely
because he had AIDS.
Lastly, the program must be a recipient of federal funds as
defined under section 504. 4 ' 4 The Restoration Act restored and
clarified the term "program or activity" under section 504 to ensure
its broad scope of coverage. 415 Congress rejected the United States
Supreme Court's narrow application of section 504 to only those
programs that actually received federal funding in favor of broader
institution-wide coverage.'" Since the enactment of the Restoration
Act, courts have applied the Restoration Act in holding that all of
the operations of federally assisted institutions fall under the obli-
gations of section 504, whether or not specific programs within the
institutions receive federal assistance.'"
At least one court has included state prisons in the broad in-
stitution-wide coverage under the Restoration Act.'" In Bonner v.
Arizona Department of Corrections, the United States District Court for
the District of Arizona, on remand from the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Bonner v. Lewis, held that section
504 protected a handicapped state prisoner.'" The Bonner court
held that individual programs within departments of correctional
services that are the recipients of federal funds must comply with
the obligations under section 504.420 Thus, state prisoners' section
504 claims may satisfy the fourth requirement of such claims,
namely that the programs in which prisoners are denied partici-
pation qualify as federal recipients.
Even prior to the enactment of the Restoration Act, some courts
had determined that section 504 provided institution-wide as well
414 See supra note 211-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of the section 504
requirement that the program be a recipient of federal funds.
See supra notes 210-213 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Restoration
Act.
416 See id.
415 See supra note 213 and accompanying text for a discussion of courts' application of
the Restoration Act.
4 "' See Bonner v. Lewis, 714 F. Supp. 420,422 (D. Ariz. 1989).
419 Id.
47° Id.
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as program-specific protection for handicapped individuals. 421 For
example, courts had held that local school districts under federally
assisted state departments of education are protected under section
504.422
 The state departments of education would distribute federal
funds to local school districts, which then had to comply with the
obligations of section 504. 425
 Analogously, departments of correc-
tional services are recipients of federal funds, which then distribute
those funds to its state prisons. 424
 As a result, state prisons must
comply with the requirements of section 504.
Similar to cases in which courts concluded that local school
districts must meet the requirements of section 504 under the Re-
habilitation Act, the Doe court should have required the state prison
to comply with the Rehabilitation Act. In Doe, the federal govern-
ment had provided the New York Department of Correctional Ser-
vices financial assistance in 1977 to establish family visitation pro-
grams in some of its state prisons, but not specifically Auburn
Correctional Center. 425 The Department of Correctional Services
was a federal recipient which allocated federal monies to its state
prisons; thus, the Doe court should have held that the AIDS-infected
prisoner met the requirement that the program from which prison
officials denied him participation was a federal recipient. Accord-
ingly, John Doe satisfied the fourth element of a prima facie section
504 claim.
More broadly, the congressional intent of the Rehabilitation
Act was, in part, to promote independent living by protecting hand-
icapped individuals from discrimination. 426
 Congress later enacted
the Restoration Act to restore and clarify this intent by ensuring
that all the operations of federally assisted state departments are
covered under section 504. 427 State prison rehabilitative programs,
such as family visitation programs, share this intent by helping to
421 See, e.g., Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376, 379 (C.D. Cal.
1987); Association for Retarded Citizens v, Frazier, 517 F. Supp. 105, 119-20 (D. Colo. 1981).
422 See, e.g. , Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701, 703 (9th Cir. 1988); Thomas,
662 F. Supp. at 379; Association fur Retarded Citizens, 517 F. Stipp. at 119.
425 See, e.g., Chalk, 840 F.2d at 703; Thomas, 662 F. Supp. at 379; Association for Retarded
Citizens, 517 F. Stipp. at 119.
424 See Appellants' Brief at 21, Doe v. Coughlin, 71 N.Y.2d 48, 518 N.E.2d 536, 523
N.Y.S.2d 782 (1987) (No. 5402), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 196 (1988).
425 See Brief for Respondents at 12, Doe v. Coughlin, 71 N.Y.2d 48, 518 N.E.2d 536, 523
N.Y.S.2d 782 (1987) (No. 5402), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 196 (1988).
4213 Sec supra note 231 fur a discussion of the relationship between the congressional
intent behind section 504 and prison rehabilitation programs.
427 See supra notes 210-213 for a discussion of the Restoration Act.
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prepare inmates to lead productive lives.428 Since the enactment of
the Restoration Act, courts have held that such rehabilitative pro-
grams fall under the obligations of section 504. 429 Thus, programs
within federally assisted state prisons, including family visitation
programs, must comply with the obligations under section 504 in
order to realize the original intent of the Rehabilitation Act.
In Doe, the AIDS-infected prisoner's claim established a prima
facie case of handicapped discrimination because the claim satisfied
the four elements of section 504. 4" First, prisoners with AIDS are
individuals with handicaps under the Rehabilitation Act. Second,
prisoners with AIDS are otherwise qualified to participate in con-
jugal visits because reasonable accommodation can eliminate any
significant risk of transmission of AIDS. Third, prisoners are ex-
cluded from conjugal visits based solely on their AIDS status.
Finally, state prisons are recipients of federal funds under the
Rehabilitation Act.
Once the AIDS-infected prisoner has established a prima facie
case of discrimination, the burden of proof shifts to the prison
officials to demonstrate either that the AIDS-infected prisoner was
not otherwise qualified to participate in conjugal visits because of
his having AIDS, or that he was denied conjugal visits for reasons
other than his AIDS status. 48 ' Unlike constitutional claims regarding
prison regulations that courts subject to minimum scrutiny, courts
subject section 504 claims under the program's burden of proof to
more rigorous scrutiny. 432
In Doe, prison officials failed to meet their burden in disproving
the prima facie case of handicapped discrimination. They admitted
that the prisoner with AIDS was excluded from the family visitation
program based solely on his AIDS status. Further, Doe was other-
wise qualified for participation in conjugal visits. An individualized
inquiry reveals that Doe did not fail the significant risk standard
because the risk of transmission of the AIDS virus was theoretical,
not definite. Unlike tuberculosis, the transmission of the AIDS virus
428 See Bonner v. Lewis, 857 F.2d 559, 562 (9th Cir. 1988).
422 See supra notes 214-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of courts' application
of the Restoration Act to state prisons.
488
 See supra note 425 and accompanying text for a description of a prima facie case of
handicapped discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act.
"'See supra note 224 and accompanying text for a description of the burden of proof
on the part of the program.
482 See supra note 225 and accompanying text for the standard of review under section
504.
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can be avoided easily through either protected sex or abstinence.
Even if a significant risk of transmission did exist, reasonable ac-
commodation by prison officials could eliminate the significant risk.
Specifically, prison officials can follow the Connecticut policy by
ensuring that AIDS-infected prisoners and their families participate
in counseling and education regarding safe sex practices. Thus,
prison officials cannot rebut the prima facie case of handicapped
discrimination established by the AIDS-infected prisoner. .
As a result, prison officials' denial of conjugal visits to AIDS-
infected prisoners in Doe was a pretext for discrimination against
individuals with AIDS who are protected under section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. New York State is not seriously concerned with
preventing the potential transmission of AIDS when asymptomatic
carriers of the virus are allowed to participate in conjugal visits.
Moreover, given the high proportion of former or current intra-
venous drug users in state prisons,4" many undiagnosed prisoners
who participate in conjugal visits certainly are infected with the
HIV virus. This inclusion of prisoners in family visitation programs
who are at high risk for exposure to the AIDS virus, or who are
already exposed to the virus, contradicts the purported penological
interest in reducing the risk of transmission of the virus. Accord-
ingly, such contradiction belies the pretext in excluding prisoners
with AIDS from conjugal visits. Moreover, this pretext is also ap-
parent when prison officials prohibit visits not only between pris-
oners and their spouses, but also between prisoners and other family
members for whom the risk of transmission of the virus is virtually
non-existent.434 Yet, in Doe, John Doe was excluded from such
family visits because of the alleged risks posed by his condition.
In Doe, the New York Court of Appeals summarily dismissed
the claim by John Doe that prison officials discriminated against
him on the basis of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 435 The
court simply held that John Doe could be excluded from a family
visitation program because its eligibility guidelines include being
free from communicable diseases. 436 Prison officials automatically
disqualified Doe because he had a communicable disease. 4" The
4" See supra note 10 for a discussion of intravenous drug users in prisons.
4" See supra note 375 and accompanying text for a discussion of the absence of risk of
transmission of the AIDS virus from casual contact.
4" See Doe v. Coughlin, 71 N.Y.2d 48, 61, 518 N.E.2d 536, 544, 523 N.Y.S.2d 782, 790
(1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 196 (1988).
456 Id.
497 Id.
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court's reasoning that Doe was disqualified because he had a hand-
icap is a circular analysis that does not conform to the strict standard
required under section 504. This standard demands individualized
inquiry, not automatic exclusion 438
In summary, section 504 should protect prisoners with AIDS
from denial of conjugal visits arising from pretextual reasons of
prison officials. AIDS-infected prisoners deprived of conjugal visits
satisfy the four elements of a section 504 claim. First, prisoners with
AIDS are handicapped individ•tals under the Rehabilitation Act.
Second, these prisoners are otherwise qualified to participate in
conjugal visits. Third, they are excluded from conjugal visits based
solely on their AIDS status. Finally, federally assisted state prisons
qualify as federal recipients under section 504. In sum, the exclu-
sion of AIDS-infected prisoners from conjugal visits fails the strict
review required under the Rehabilitation Act.
F. The Need for Judicial Intervention
Although some states allow prisoners with AIDS to participate
in conjugal visits,439 other states, such as New York, prohibit such
participation on the basis that AIDS-infected prisoners represent a
public health risk. 44° To date, prisoners have raised few claims
against those prisons denying conjugal visits. In Doe, the one case
in which a prisoner raised such a claim, the court deferred to prison
officials, upholding prison regulations preventing an AIDS-infected
prisoner from continued participation in conjugal visits. In effect,
this court weighed the competing interests of prisons and prisoners
in favor of purported penological goals at the expense of significant
constitutional and statutory rights of prisoners.
Courts' traditional deference to prison officials in their for-
mulation of prison regulations arises from the assumption that
prison officials have expertise and knowledge in penal matters with
which courts should not interfere."' Courts have granted a pre-
sumption of administrative good faith to prison officials in their
438 See School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 274 (1987).
4" See supra note 17 for a list of states allowing conjugal visits.
445 See, e.g., Doe v. Coughlin, 71 N.Y.2d 48, 48, 518 N.E.2d 536, 536, 523 N.Y.S.2d 782,
782 (1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 196 (1988).
441 See supra notes 35-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of judicial deference
to prison officials.
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drafting and enforcing of regulations and policies. 442 Courts pre-
sume that such regulations and policies are rationally related to
legitimate penological interests. The presumption of good faith
ends, only when prison regulations may violate constitutionally pro-
tected rights of prisoners. 443
Denial of family visitation programs for AIDS-infected pris-
oners violates such constitutional rights. Judicial deference is not
appropriate, therefore, in a case such as Doe, where prison admin-
istrators formulate regulations arising from illegitimate penological
interests. In Turner v. Salley, the United States Supreme Court held
that a prison regulation prohibiting marriage could not be justified
by the purported penological goal of security for prison staff and
other inmates because the inmate's private decision to marry did
not affect them. 444 The Court regarded the regulation as an exag-
gerated response to claimed security objectives. 445 Thus, under the
Turner doctrine, judicial deference is inappropriate when prison
regulations are based on alleged penological interests that are nei-
ther legitimate nor neutral.
When prison , officials formulate regulations arising from pen-
ological interests that do not address institutional operations, such
as security, order, or discipline, judicial deference is not appropriate
because prison officials are acting outside the realm of their exper-
tise. In Doe, prison officials acted outside their expertise in that they
did not even raise issues of institutional operations in justifying
their exclusion of an AIDS-infected prisoner from conjugal visits.
Prison officials regarded, public safety as a sufficiently legitimate
penological interest to justify the exclusion of John Doe from the
family visitation program in order to protect his spouse from the
risk of contagion. Although the New York correctional system iden-
tified public safety as a penological interest in section 70(2)(a) of
the Correction Law, prison officials should construe its meaning
narrowly. 446 As Judge Alexander noted in his dissenting opinion in
442 See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547-48 (1979); see also Block v. Rutherford,
468 U.S. 576, 594 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring), Justice Blackmun criticized the majority
opinion in Bell because of its wide-ranging deference to prison administrators, stating "[Ole
fact that particular measures advance prison security, however, does not make them ipso facto
constitutional." Id.
445 See Bell, 441 U.S. at 562.
444 See Turner v. Salley, 482 U.S. 78, 98 (1987).
445 Id. at 97-98.
416 See New York Correction Law, section 70(2)(a), which states in part that prison
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Doe, public safety involves protecting the community from danger-
ous criminals, not'imposing public health concerns. 447
 Although the
health of the community may be of general public interest, it does
not fall within the range of legitimate penological interests of prison
officials. When such officials act outside the realm of their expertise
and knowledge, traditional judicial deference is no longer appro-
priate.
Prison officials must, of course, fashion policies and regulations
in response to the AIDS crisis. Such regulations, however, should
be construed narrowly to respond to the institutional environment
for which such officials are accountable. Public safety goals may be
appropriate with respect to protecting the community from violent
criminals, but prison officials exceed their authority and power
when they espouse such goals to protect the community from AIDS.
In such instances, courts should intervene to protect the rights of
AIDS-infected prisoners, not defer to prison officials whose actions
are beyond their scope of expertise and authority. In fact, courts
must intervene because they offer the only remedy for this infringe-
.
ment upon the constitutional and statutory rights of inmates with
AIDS.
V. CONCLUSION
The court in Doe v. Coughlin applied the incorrect standard of
review in upholding prison officials' right to deny conjugal visits to
a prisoner with AIDS. Conjugal visits implicate the fundamental
right to marital privacy, which deserves the highest level of judicial
scrutiny. By applying strict scrutiny,, courts should strike down
prison regulations denying A1DS-infected prisoners from partici-
pating in conjugal visits because prison officials are unable to dem-
onstrate any compelling state interest for such regulations.
First, the exclusion of AIDS-infected prisoners from conjugal
visits requires this highest standard of judicial review to ensure that
the constitutionally protected right to marital privacy of prisoners
and their family members is adequately protected. Strict scrutiny
exposes the unconstitutionality of depriving prisoners with AIDS
of conjugal visits when they meet all the criteria for participation,
except for their HIV status. Future courts should recognize the
programs may be established with due regard to . . . the safety and security of the com-
munity." N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 70(2)(a) (McKinney 1987).
"7 See Doe v. Coughlin, 71 N.Y.2d 48, 74, 518 N.E.2d 536, 553, 523 N.Y.S.2d 782, 799
(1987) (Alexander, J., dissenting), cm. denied, 109 S. Ct. 196 (1988).
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need for strict scrutiny where fundamental rights are implicated,
even when those rights are denied by prison officials, a group to
whom the courts traditionally grant much deference.
Second, even if courts continue to employ minimum scrutiny
in their review of prison regulations denying the participation of
AIDS-infected prisoners in conjugal visits, they should conduct a
thorough application of the Turner test. In doing so, courts should
assess carefully the legitimacy of penological goals put forward by
prison officials to justify this infringement upon the constitutional
rights of these prisoners. Judge Alexander, in his dissenting opinion
in Doe, was correct in stating that public health as a penological
objective in this context is illegitimate and, accordingly, prison of-
ficials fail even the minimum scrutiny of the Turner test. To this
end, the exclusion of AIDS-infected prisoners from conjugal visits
solely because of their having AIDS is unconstitutional, depriving
prisoners and their family members of the constitutionally protected
right to marital privacy.
Third, the exclusion of prisoners with AIDS from conjugal
visits also illegally discriminates on the basis of handicap. Under
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, an individual with AIDS is a
handicapped individual whose exclusion from a federally funded
program must be subject to strict review. When prisoners with AIDS
are otherwise qualified to participate in conjugal visits and are ex-
cluded solely because of their having AIDS, such exclusion repre-
sents discrimination prohibited under section 504.
Prisoners with AIDS should not be denied benefits or rights
available to other prisoners solely because of their HIV status.
Courts must conduct thoughtful individualized inquiries to ensure
that prisoners with AIDS are not subject to blanket discrimination
merely because they bear the stigma of being both incarcerated and
afflicted with a life-threatening illness. For such afflicted individuals,
courts may be the sole source of protection.
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